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Abstract: Malicious insiders continue to pose a great threat to organizations.  With their 
knowledge and access to organizational resources, malicious insiders could launch 
attacks more easily that result in more damaging impacts compared to outsiders. 
However, empirical research about malicious insiders is rare due to the unavailability of 
data. With few exceptions, many studies focus on a small number of cases. In order to 
identify common characteristics of a large number of malicious insiders, these studies 
employ text mining to analyze 133 real-world cases of offenders from military units, 
intelligence agencies, and business organizations with data available to public. I first 
compare malicious insiders sample with the general public then to the sample of benign 
insiders. The results show that the prevalence of antisocial personality disorder, avoidant 
personality disorder, disruptive mood dysregulation disorder and disgruntlement among 
malicious insider are higher than the general public and the sample of benign insiders. 
Also, the prevalence of interactions of disgruntlement and personality disorders among 
malicious insiders are higher than the benign insiders. The final study found that the 
emotional characteristics of malicious insiders are more associated with expressive 
attacks, on the other side, cognitive characteristics are more associated with 
instrumental attacks. Contributions of this study reside in two aspects: first, I utilize 
public data from documented malicious insider cases, implying a potentially valuable 
data source for future studies in this domain; second, I validate malicious insider 
characteristics identified in previous research, thereby establishing a foundation for 
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CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION 
 
The threat of malicious insiders has been a long lasting problem for organizations. In 480 BC, 
Ephialtes betrayed his own people, the Spartans, and helped Persia to invade his homeland, 
leading to the falling of Spartacus as well as his king, Leonidas (Herodotus, about 450 BC). Most 
recently, a former engineer of Google was alleged to steal thousands of files regarding the 
driverless car project “Waymo” before he resigned from google without prior notice. He then 
started his own company and sold it to Uber for $700 million (Isaac, 2017).  
The problem of malicious insiders has raised concerns of both practitioners and academia 
(Chen et al., 2012). For practitioners, the US Secret Service and Carnegie Mellon University 
conducted a series of studies in this area (CPNI, 2013). For researchers, a broad body of research 
has been conducted with respect to the deterrence of insiders’ harmful behaviors (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnson, 2014).  
These reports and studies established an insightful foundation for the study of malicious 
insiders. However, the current studies of malicious insiders are subject to some problems. Many 
studies focus on a single case as the unit of analysis and derive their findings in the form of 
technical reports that lack peer review (Band et al., 2006; Nurse et al., 2014). Academic research 
endeavors often lack empirical testing with sufficient numbers of real world malicious insider 
cases (Kamoun & Nicho, 2014; Nurse et al., 2014). Also, malicious insiders have been seen as a 
homogeneous group. However, malicious insiders, as a group of human beings, are 
heterogeneous in nature with respect to their personal characteristics. These differences influence  
insiders’ responses to organizational security measures and deterrence  methods (Johnston et al., 




This study is to investigate the aforementioned problems by analyzing a large number of real 
world malicious insider cases. These malicious insiders conduct various types of malicious 
attacks, including economic espionage, leaking and sabotage. 
In the first study, I start with comparing malicious insiders with the general public, in order to 
validate the characteristics proposed by previous research. Results of the first study show that the 
prevalence of several personality disorders and disgruntlement among malicious insiders is higher 
than the general public.  
Furthermore, I argue that, in order to fully support the findings and to utilize this result in 
information security practice, malicious insiders need to be compared with the benign insiders, 
because there is a chance that the malicious insiders share the same characteristics with the star 
employees. Also, to fully understand the characteristics of the malicious insiders, the level of 
analysis should extend from single characteristic level to include the interactions between 
characteristics. Thus in the second paper, I compare the malicious insiders with the CEOs from 
Fortune 500 with respect to both the individual characteristic level and the interactions level, 
finding that results found in the first paper are still valid when the sample of malicious insiders 
are compared with the benign insiders. 
Finally, I analyzed the relationships between the characteristics of malicious insiders with the 
different types of attacks they conducted in the third study. This investigation is inspired by the 
fact that the characteristic that are not salient among all the malicious insider cases could label a 
certain type of malicious attacks. For example, narcissistic personality disorder is not a distinct 
characteristic of malicious insiders compared to neither the general public nor the benign insiders, 
however, malicious insiders with the manipulative nature of narcissistic personality tend to 
conduct attacks to benefit themselves. 
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CHAPTER II: AN EMPIRICAL VALIDATION OF MALICIOUS INSIDER 
CHARACTERISTICS1 
 
Insider attack is nothing new. In the famous book The Art of War, about 2500 years ago Sun 
Tzu described 5 different kinds of spies. A more recent case, the notorious spy Aldrich Ames was 
first evaluated as an “enthusiastic employee” at the beginning of his CIA career. As recognition 
for his outstanding performance, he eventually gained top-level clearances and access to 
countless classified intelligence documents. However, trust in him finally turned out to be a CIA 
nightmare (Weiner et al., 2014). 
Unlike outsiders, insiders like Ames are legitimately empowered to access, and manipulate an 
organization’s information’s resources (Bishop & Gates, 2008). Insider attacks are not only easier 
to launch, but also can be more devastating. Damages of insider attack involve financial loss, 
disruption to the organization, loss of reputation, and a long-term impact on the organizational 
culture (Hunker & Probst, 2011). 
The threat of malicious insiders has drawn attention from both practitioners and academia 
(Chen et al., 2012). For practitioners, the US Secret Service and Carnegie Mellon University 
conducted a series of studies in this area (CPNI, 2013), involving the comparison of sabotage and 
espionage (Band et al., 2006), sabotage in critical infrastructures (Moore et al., 2008) and insider 
threat in financial sectors (Randazzo et al., 2005). With respect to academic research, this area of 
study demands more comprehensive and in depth research because the temporal precedents of 
malicious insiders’ attacks are currently under researched (Willison & Warkentin, 2013).  
                                                          
1 Chapter 2 is published at Journal of Management Information Systems.  Liang, N., Biros, D. P., & Luse, 
A. (2016). An Empirical Validation of Malicious Insider Characteristics. Journal of Management 
Information Systems, 33(2), 361-392. 
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In order to investigate and aid in the mitigation of the threat posed by potential malicious 
insiders, it is necessary to shed light on the characteristics of known malicious insider abusers 
(Crossler et al., 2013). Researchers focusing on known insider incidents have suggested a number 
of characteristics thought to be prevalent in malicious insiders (Claycomb et al., 2013; Kamoun & 
Nicho, 2014; Willison, 2006); however, current research has several problems and limitations. 
Many studies focus on a single case as the unit of analysis and derive their findings in the form of 
technical reports that lack peer review (Band et al., 2006; Nurse et al., 2014). Academic research 
endeavors often lack empirical testing with sufficient numbers of real world malicious insider 
cases (Kamoun & Nicho, 2014; Nurse et al., 2014). While the current body of research posits a 
number of potential characteristics of insider threat, they come from multiple and distinct 
perspectives resulting in the lack of a systematic framework to integrate all characteristics for a 
clear and solid foundation to facilitate future studies (Claycomb et al., 2013; Kamoun & Nicho, 
2014; Nurse et al., 2014; M. Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
Part of the reason for the aforementioned shortcomings is due to a lack of data (Noy & 
McGuinness, 2001).  Organizations are reluctant to disclose malicious insider data in fear of 
negative effects on their reputation (Willison & Warkentin, 2009). One potential way to 
overcome this issue and gain access to a larger number of malicious insider cases is to mine data 
from non-security related sources (Crossler et al., 2013). Twyman et al. have suggested an 
autonomous scientifically controlled screening system to detect hidden information, including 
insider threat intention, via screening interview results (Twyman et al., 2014). However, it might 
be economically inefficient to interview all employees. In this research I employ text mining 
techniques (Dumais, 2004) to evaluate a sample of 133 malicious insider threat cases pulled from 
public data in order to validate malicious insiders’ characteristics and answer the research 
question:  
1. Can text mining be employed to validate characteristics of malicious insiders? 
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Researchers have suggested a number of characteristics of malicious insiders (Crossler et al., 
2013; Willison, 2006; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). The prevalence of such characteristics has 
not been examined in a large sample of malicious insiders. I take the keywords garnered from our 
text mining and code them according to characteristic identified in previous research (Crossler et 
al., 2013; Willison, 2006; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). I extrapolate the proportion of 
individuals with the given characteristics, but question how this compares to the proportion of 
individuals in the population at large that display these same characteristics? It would be useful to 
see if there is a significant proportional difference that allows the identification of characteristic 
areas more prevalent in malicious insiders. By comparing these proportions, I are able to answer 
the research question: 
2. Do malicious insiders exhibit different levels of characteristics than those 
exhibited by the general public? 
In order to answer our research questions, I will start with a comprehensive literature review 
in Section 2 to extract a pool of characteristics from the literature. This pool of characteristics is 
used as a “characteristic dictionary” in Section 3, where I will propose the framework and method 
to search for characteristics from real world malicious insider cases. After that, the results of a 
test of the proposed method will be presented. Limitations of this study and future research plans 
will also be discussed. 
2.1 Literature Review 
As noted, previous research on malicious insiders includes academic research, technical 
reports, and various other sources.  In this section, I suggest theoretical considerations and I will 
present definitions or descriptions of characteristics from the literature in related domains.  
2.1.1 Theoretical Consideration 
The extant literature suggests that malicious insiders exhibit certain characteristics; however, 
malicious insider attacks include other relevant aspects including the attacker, organizational 
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factors, environment, and systems (Chen et al., 2012; Predd et al., 2008).  A recent leadership 
study review (Northouse, 2015) shows that effective leadership is related to leader skills and 
traits, leader behavior, influence process, and other situational behaviors. Additionally, in early 
leadership studies in the 1930’s and 1940’s, the trait approach was popular and considerable 
research was conducted to investigate the unique traits an effective leader possesses (Yukl, 2002). 
Although criticized for its lack of consideration for situational and mitigating factors (Yukl, 
2002), traits of leaders are still starting points for recent leadership research (Dinh et al., 2014), 
such as leaders’ charisma traits (Bono & Ilies, 2006), leaders’ skills (Lord & Hall, 2005), or 
leaders’ attributes and behaviors (Uhl-Bien, 2006).  
Similar to how researchers have investigated leaders, I believe that Trait Theory may help in 
explaining malicious insider threats. If traits or characteristics can be identified and attributed to 
malicious insiders, it could prove useful to future research in profiling and catching them.   
2.1.2 Terminology and Definitions 
One of the challenges insider threat studies face is the lack of a well-accepted definition of 
insiders (Hunker & Probst, 2011). Different researchers define the term in different ways: 
Willison and Warkentin (Willison & Warkentin, 2013) define insiders from the perspective of 
their privilege as employees or others who have access privileges as well as intimate knowledge 
of organization. Bishop and Gates (Bishop & Gates, 2008) define insiders based on their actions: 
one who violates organizational security policies. Others define insiders from the aspect of their 
relations with organization such as a trusted person who has access to internal information 
(Brackney & Anderson, 2004).  Bishop (Bishop & Gates, 2008) argues that the definition of 
insider is contingent on the definition of perimeter such that the one inside the perimeter is 
insider. Hunker (Hunker & Probst, 2011) further state that the definition of insider depends on the 
research questions.  
In the current research, our subjects are not confined to information systems.  The subject pool 
includes all kinds of insiders attacked information or information systems.  Additionally, the 
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malicious actions performed by these insiders include a broad range of activities. Therefore, in 
this research I use the broad definition by Bishop et al. (Bishop & Gates, 2008), which defines 
insider as: 
An insider is a person that has been legitimately empowered with the right to access, 
represent, or decide about one or more assets of the organization’s structure. 
Consistent with the definition of insider, I use the Predd et al. (Predd et al., 2008) definition of 
insider threat as: 
Insider threat is an insider’s action that puts an organization or its resources at risk.  
As indicated by Crossler et al. (Crossler et al., 2013), insiders whose actions cause damage to 
the organization could be differentiated by their intentions: those who intentionally harm the 
organization with deviant behaviors and those who unintentionally do something wrong, often 
labeled as insider threats. Also, any investigation focusing on this field should not mix these two 
different types of subjects. Other research also supports their arguments by proposing the insider 
threat continuum (Willison & Warkentin, 2013) from passive, non-volitional noncompliance 
behavior to volitional but not malicious noncompliance and finally, these intentional, malicious 
insiders. This continuum is also proposed by other researchers (Guo et al., 2011; Hu et al., 2011). 
The wording might be different; however, intention is consistently the key to differentiate 
different types of insiders within this continuum. Therefore, in this study, I modify Predd’s 
definition by integrating intention factors to finally narrow down to our subjects, the malicious 
insiders: 
Malicious insiders are insiders who intentionally put an organization or its resources at risk. 
2.1.3 Characteristics of Malicious Insiders 
Previous research has identified a number of characteristics that one or more malicious 
insiders have exhibited. As previously stated, many studies focused on a single case and very few 
considered larger samples. Therefore, characteristics of malicious insiders across a large number 
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of cases have yet to be determined. In the following sections, I review some of the potential 
malicious insider characteristics noted in the literature to date. 
2.1.3.1 Personality Problems 
Personality disorders include classic Axis II personality disorders (First, 1994), such as 
antisocial personality disorder (Shechter & Lang, 2011), narcissistic personality disorder (E. D. 
Shaw & Fischer, 2005; Shechter & Lang, 2011; B. Wood, 2000), and psychopathy (Shechter & 
Lang, 2011). Research suggests that malicious insiders (CPNI, 2013) may have a sense of 
entitlement (Band et al., 2006; Nurse et al., 2014; E. D. Shaw & Stock, 2011) and grandiosity 
(Gelles, 2005) and tend to have an inappropriate sense of self-importance or self-esteem (Gelles, 
2005; Turner & Gelles, 2012) such as Machiavellianism (Maasberg et al., 2015; Nurse et al., 
2014). Some have engaged in unrealistic fascination about spy work, imaginary activities (CPNI, 
2013), power, or reputation (Nurse et al., 2014). 
2.1.3.2 Mental Health Disorder 
Mental health disorder involves evidence of Axis I Psychiatric Diagnoses derived from the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic Manual (First, 1994).  Research reports mental 
health disorders such as alcohol and drug addiction, panic attacks, or seizure disorders being 
observed in malicious insiders (Band et al., 2006; Moore et al., 2008). Addictive behavior seems 
to be associated with malicious insider attacks (Johnson, 2014). These mental disorders and 
addictions often result in an exploitable or vulnerable lifestyle (CPNI, 2013). 
2.1.3.3 Ethical Issues 
Ethical beliefs are found to be relevant with insiders’ rule violation behaviors (Chatterjee et 
al., 2015; Vance et al., 2013). Ethical issues are described as lack of empathy, conscience (E. D. 
Shaw & Stock, 2011), lack of personal integrity (Nurse et al., 2014), no remorse for the harm 
imposed on others, and an unscrupulous manner.  Other issues include being superficial instead of 
truthful and lack of conscientiousness (CPNI, 2013). Malicious insiders’ lack of ethics is usually 
accompanied with reduced loyalty or attachment to the organization (Nurse et al., 2014). Employ 
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fraud, which is one type of malicious attach, is also to be found related to ethical flexibility 
(Murphy & Dacin, 2011). 
2.1.3.4 Social Isolation 
Band (Band et al., 2006) defines social isolation problems as “…chronic problems getting 
along and working with others”. Shaw and Fischer (E. D. Shaw & Stock, 2011) find in their case 
study that malicious insiders lack social skills which increase their propensity for social isolation. 
Shaw (E. Shaw et al., 1998) finds malicious insiders are typically introverts, and some are overly 
dependent on computers. Moore also reports lack of social skills as one characteristic of 
malicious insiders (Moore et al., 2008).  
2.1.3.5 Personal or Work-Related Event 
Band et al. (Band et al., 2006) defines personal or work-related event as “events that cause 
concerning behaviors in individuals predisposed to malicious acts.” Moore (Moore et al., 2008) 
also confirms that malicious insiders typically experience stressful work-related events such as 
sanctions or internal audit. Also, the stressful experience of employees might result in higher 
probability of security breach (D'Arcy et al., 2014). Additionally, personal issues such as loss of 
family member, relationship break up or significant personal injury could also indicate a potential 
malicious insider (CPNI, 2013). 
2.1.3.6 Emotional Characteristics 
 Malicious insiders are suggested to be emotionally unstable (CPNI, 2013) and might react to 
work-related issues negatively instead of constructively. These include feelings of being betrayed 
or isolated (Band et al., 2006) and fear of being excluded (Nurse et al., 2014). As a result of their 
inappropriate feelings, they might exhibit anger (Band et al., 2006), poor work attitude, or being 
stressed. However, some research states that instead of feeling negatively, malicious insiders 




Many studies (Greitzer et al., 2008; Nurse et al., 2014; Warkentin et al., 2011; Willison & 
Warkentin, 2009) argue that malicious insiders are also disgruntled employees. A study 
examining the Department of Agriculture and IT sabotage in the US critical infrastructure 
program proposes disgruntlement as a potential characteristic of malicious insiders. The 
disgruntlement might be a result of unmet expectations (Moore et al., 2008), lack of appreciation, 
and feelings of injustice or inequality (Nurse et al., 2014). 
2.1.3.8 Social and Cultural Conflict 
Shaw and Fischer (E. D. Shaw & Fischer, 2005) define social and cultural conflict as 
“differences between social, racial, or technical groups leading to tensions and conflict between 
the subject and others.” For example, one malicious insider made a racial comment about his 
African-American supervisor (E. D. Shaw & Fischer, 2005). Shaw (E. Shaw et al., 1998) finds 
that malicious insiders are frustrated with their personal or social relations. 
2.1.3.9 Behavior Precursor 
 Behavioral characteristics preceding malicious attack include suspicious verbal behavior 
(Schultz, 2002), confrontation with peers or supervisors (Band et al., 2006), sexual harassment, 
hygiene problems (Moore et al., 2008), problems of accepting feedback and criticism, and anger 
management issues (Greitzer et al., 2013). Being defensive of criticism also appears to be a 
behavior precursor (Turner & Gelles, 2012). 
2.1.3.10 Negative Experience 
Lastly, Shaw & Fischer (Band et al., 2006) found malicious insiders experience 
disappointment with family or friends. As such, they might have negative history such as history 
of rule violation (Moore et al., 2008) and/or criminal and mental disorder (Nurse et al., 2014).  
2.1.4 Other Factors 
While the previous section presented characteristics of malicious insiders found in the extant 
literature, insider attacks could also be enabled by other factors. Additionally, before the attack is 
launched, other characteristics might exist beyond the psychology of the perpetrator. These might 
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be conditions or precursors that promote or support the malicious act.  In this section, I will 
review and present other factors that could enable malicious insider attack. 
2.1.4.1 Overdependence 
By definition, insiders have access and knowledge of the organization which could facilitate 
the attack if they turn to malicious acts (B. Wood, 2000). Further, malicious insiders are often 
recruited by organizations as they may be domain experts or they are familiar with the work they 
are responsible for in the organization (B. Wood, 2000).  In short, the organization needs them.  
Once malicious insiders have managerial control or access out of proportion to their technical or 
managerial duties, they could be a threat unless sufficiently supervised (Band et al., 2006). 
2.1.4.2 Preparatory Behavior 
 Schultz (Schultz, 2002) argues that malicious insiders might leave deliberate marks to make a 
statement, make mistakes during preparation, and exhibit observable behaviors as part of 
preparation for the malicious action. These behaviors include information collection behaviors, 
information transmittal behaviors, and recruitment behaviors (S. Wood et al., 2005). Specifically, 
insiders might perform technical precursors such as downloading hacking software (Moore et al., 
2008), establishing backdoor entry to information systems (Band et al., 2006), violating security 
policy, or undertaking unauthorized handling of classified materials (CPNI, 2013). 
2.1.4.3 Financial Status 
Some malicious insiders are motivated by profit (Shropshire, 2009; B. Wood, 2000) because 
of debt (Band et al., 2006; Cressey, 1953); and as a result, they might exhibit characteristics of 
illegal income such as a sudden change of lifestyle or excess spending.  For example, when 
interviewed about his spying activities, Robert Hansen told investigators his motive was profit 
(Wise, 2002).   
2.1.4.4 Rationalization 
Research finds that malicious insiders might rationalize their behavior (Warkentin et al., 2011) 
by self-deception (Turner & Gelles, 2012), blaming others, or arguing what they compromise is 
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not important (Gelles, 2005; Kamoun & Nicho, 2014). Individuals who conduct Internet fraud, 
which is a subtype of malicious attack, tend to rationalize their behaviors (Cohen et al., 2012; 
Cressey, 1953; Murphy & Dacin, 2011; Wm. Dennis Huber et al., 2015). A summary of all the 
aforementioned characteristics is presented in Table 1. 




Personality Disorder 1. Sense of entitlement  
2. Grandiosity  
3. Sense of self-importance 
1. Band et al., 2006; Nurse et al., 
2014; Shaw & Stock, 2011;  
2. Gelles, 2005  
3. Gelles, 2005; Turner & Gelles, 
2012 
Mental Health Disorder 1. Addictive Behavior 
2. Exploitable Behavior 
3. Panic Attack 
1. Johnson, 2014 
2. Shaw & Stock, 2011  
3. Band et. al., 2006; Moore, et al., 
2008 
Ethical Issues 1. Lack of empathy 
2. Lack of Conscience 
3. Superficial 
1. Nurse et al., 2014  
2. Shaw & Stock, 2011 
3. Shaw & Stock, 2011 
Social Isolation 1. Lack of Social Skills 
2. Dependent on Computer 
3. Introverted 
1. Shaw & Fischer, 2011 
2. Shaw et al., 1998 
3. Shaw et al., 1998 
Related Event 1. Demotion 
2. Change in Supervisor 
3. Personal Conflict; 
1. Band et al., 2006  
2. Nurse et al., 2014; Moore, et. al. 
2008 
3. Nurse et al., 2014 
Emotional Characteristics 1. Feeling being Betrayed; 
2. Fear of being Excluded; 
3. Anger; 
1. Shaw & Fischer, 2011 
2. Nurse et al., 2014 
3. Band et al., 2006 
Disgruntlement 1. Unmet Expectation; 
2. Lack of Appreciation; 
3. Feeling of Injustice; 
1. Moore, et al., 2008 
2. Nurse et al., 2014 
3. Nurse et al., 2014 
Social and Cultural 
Conflict 
1. Racial Comment; 
2. Frustrated with Relations; 
1. Shaw & Stock, 2011 
2. Shaw et al., 1998 
Behavior Precursor 1. Verbal Behavior; 
2. Sexual Harassment; 
3. Defensive upon Criticism; 
1. Schultz, 2002 
2. Moore, et al., 2008  
3. Turner & Gelles, 2012 
Negative Experience 1. Disappointment with 
Friends; 
2. History of Arrest; 
3. History of Mental Disorder; 
1. Shaw & Fischer, 2011 
2. Moore, et al., 2008 
3. Nurse et al., 2014 
Overdependence 1. Managerial control; 
2. Root administrator; 
3. Without supervision; 
1. Shaw & Stock, 2011 
2. Shaw & Stock, 2011 
3. Shaw & Stock, 2011 
Preparatory Behavior 1. Download Hack Software; 
2. Creating Backdoor 
Account; 
3. Information Collection; 
1. Moore, et al., 2008 
2. Band et al., 2006  
3. Wood et al., 2005 
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Financial Status 1. Debt; 
2. Illegal Income; 
3. Change of Lifestyle; 
1,2. Band et al., 2006; 
3. Wood, 2000 
 
Rationalization 1. Self-Deception; 
2. Blaming others; 
3. Bragging or Joking about 
Classified Information 
1.Turner & Gelles, 2012 
2. Kamoun & Nicho, 2014; Gelles, 
2005  
3. Kamoun & Nicho, 2014; Gelles, 
2005  
 
As implied by previous research, malicious insiders might exhibit some personality cues, be in 
a certain status, or exhibit suspicious behaviors. However, most research lacks sufficient data, 
resulting in a lack of strong empirical analysis. In the following section, I propose a method 
designed to verify the aforementioned characteristics as well as extract characteristics that emerge 
in cases but are not mentioned by previous research. 
2.1.5 States and Traits 
The current research investigates the characteristic commonality among known malicious 
insiders;  as identified by the previous research, characteristics should be considered as two types: 
traits or states (Chaplin et al., 1988). Although not explicitly defined, Allport and Odbert (Allport 
& Odbert, 1936) describes trait as “consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment to 
his environment” and states as “present activity, temporary states of mind and mood”. 
For the purpose of validation, in the current study I will shed light on the commonality of 
traits or characteristics, including trait-like conditions, among malicious insiders. Contrarily, by 
the definition of states, they should be very sensitive to the uniqueness of each individual case, 
such that I do not expect certain behaviors or events presented in one case to be commonly 
observed in other cases. 
2.1.6 Propositions 
As noted, previous research has identified a number of potential characteristics believed to be 
common of malicious insiders.  The potential characteristics have yet to be validated across a 
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large sample of malicious insiders.  The question then becomes, do malicious insiders exhibit 
these characteristics different than the rest of the general population? 
   Narcissistic personality disorder is characterized by grandiosity and sense of entitlement 
(First, 1994). One with the sense of grandiose and superiority typically believes that they possess 
unparalleled skills or talent (Gelles, 2005); and with their self-perceived abilities, they are prone 
to fantasize about power, success, and attractiveness (Shechter & Lang, 2011), and perceive 
themselves as deserving special, or preferential, treatment (E. D. Shaw & Fischer, 2005).  Once 
their craving for admiration and special attention cannot be met, they might seek validation and 
affirmation of their self-importance from other sources such as competitors or opponents (Gelles, 
2005). Even if they don’t seek ego fulfillment themselves, their eagerness for recognition subjects 
them to showboating and manipulation (Shechter & Lang, 2011).  
On the other hand, if individuals have antisocial personal disorders which is defined as a 
“pervasive disregard for the law and the rights of others” (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000), they tend to aim at whatever they want, no matter whether it is illegal or others might be 
hurt. Since these insiders know more about the organization (Bishop & Gates, 2008) and it is hard 
for them to form attachment and loyalty to the organization (Gelles, 2005), they are prone to 
attack the organization from inside.  
Avoidant personality disorder is characterized by social inhibition and unwillingness to get 
involved with people (First, 1994). However, teamwork is essential in organizations and social 
skills are essential in team settings (Morgeson et al., 2005). The inability to work and 
communicate effectively with others decreases the odds of confronting colleagues with legitimate 
work-related complaints (Band et al., 2006). When the employee experiences stressful personal or 
work-related events such as demotion or death of significant others (Band et al., 2006; Nurse et 
al., 2014), isolation resulting from avoidant personality disorder jeopardizes the possibility that 
they could solve problems constructively (Shechter & Lang, 2011). Instead, they might engage in 
more destructive behavior and launch an insider attack. Given this, I propose the following: 
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Proposition 1-1: Prevalence of narcissistic personality disorder in malicious insiders is 
higher compared to general population. 
Proposition 1-2: Prevalence of antisocial disorder in malicious insider is higher 
compared to general population. 
Proposition 1-3: Prevalence of avoidant personality disorder in malicious insider is 
higher compared to general population. 
Disruptive mood dysregulation disorder (DMDD) is one type of mental health disorder which 
is featured by persistently outburst of temper or often irritable mood (DSM-5 American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). DMDD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) is structurally 
linked to emotion regulation and is highly associated with negative emotional response such as 
emotional instability or bursts of anger (Etkin & Wager, 2007).  Studies about malicious insiders 
report high correlation between the presence of emotional dysregulation and malicious intent 
(Greitzer et al., 2013).  
Therefore, I propose: 
Proposition 2: Prevalence of disruptive mood dysregulation disorder in malicious 
insiders is higher compared to the general population. 
Comorbidities of substance abuse and anxiety disorder as well as personality disorder are 
observed in a national-wide survey (Grant, Stinson, Dawson, Chou, Dufour, et al., 2004; Grant, 
Stinson, Dawson, Chou, Ruan, et al., 2004). Coupled with the fact that the addiction behaviors 
could impair professional abilities (Band et al., 2006), employees who have a substance addiction 
probably fail to work effectively and productively, making mistakes which might result in poor 
performance reviews, disciplinary action (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010), or sanctions (Moore et al., 
2008). These events might cause the individual stress leading to a malicious attack from inside 
(Shechter & Lang, 2011).  Given this, I propose: 
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Proposition 3-1: Prevalence of alcohol abuse in malicious insiders is higher compared to 
the general population. 
Proposition 3-2: Prevalence of substance abuse in malicious insiders is higher compared 
to the general population.  
Work place disgruntlement is associated with perceived organizational injustice (Warkentin et 
al., 2011; Willison & Warkentin, 2009). Adams claims that individuals that feel a sense of 
inequality may attempt to mitigate this feeling by behavioral means such as acting out in some 
manner (Adams, 1965). In extreme cases, these behavioral means might include malicious attacks 
such as computer crime (Warkentin et al., 2011; Willison & Warkentin, 2009).  Further, the 
devalued or dissatisfied feelings of disgruntled employees (Greitzer et al., 2008) might affect 
their emotional state (Nurse et al., 2014) resulting in negative feelings toward the employer or 
colleagues. Once such negative feelings turn severe or even destructive, disgruntled employees 
tend to launch attacks (CPNI, 2013). I therefore propose: 
Proposition 4: Prevalence of disgruntlement in malicious insiders is higher compared to 
the general population. 
Considering these propositions I now focus on a method for evaluating them. The following 
section describes our process for validating characteristics of malicious insiders compared to that 
of the general population. I believe malicious insiders exhibit the characteristics noted above in 
greater levels than found in the general US population.   At this point, our validation efforts focus 
on individual characteristics only.   While consideration of interactions of characteristics is 




In this study, I will compare the percentage of malicious insiders with certain characteristics 
with the percentage of the same characteristics in general public. With respect to malicious 
insiders, the methods employed in the current study include three steps: in the first step I use the 
name of malicious insiders (n=133) to collect relevant documents about him/her. Next, in the 
second step I use a random subset of samples (n=30) to construct and update our dictionary. 
Finally, I use this dictionary to search and extract characteristics in malicious insider portfolios. 
As for the general public, I use the reported percentages from previous studies and surveys. In 
this section, I will first describe the procedure employed to collect data and construct the 
dictionary, then the extraction process will be introduced. Finally, I will introduce sources of data 
about general public as well as how will I compare the malicious insiders in our sample and the 
general population.  
Figure 1 shows the process flow diagram of the first and second step. The dictionary creation 
includes four parts: data collection, dictionary construction, characteristic retrieval, and dictionary 
update. Note that the process starts from the one at the up left and bottom middle and then ends in 
up right. 
2.2.1 Sampling Criteria and Data Collection 
The malicious insiders to be analyzed in this study are drawn from malicious insider’s 
population who were convicted by US courts from 2000 to 2015. Malicious attacks of these 
convicted include spying, espionage, economic espionage, illegal exports and other security 
related acts. 
Due to the infrequency of malicious insider cases, previous research suggests that it is 
impractical to draw a random sample (Band et al., 2006). In the current study, I utilize the 
eminence criterion proposed by Simonton (Dean Keith Simonton, 1999) to select the sample. 
This criterion has been applied in studies to investigate personality or social psychology when 
direct analysis of the subjects is far more difficult and even practically or ethically impossible 
(Dean Keith Simonton, 1999). For example, it is almost impossible to ask Edward Snowden to 
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fill out some personality assessment questionnaire2.  This type of research includes the 
investigation of the relationship between creativity and leadership (Vessey et al., 2014), the mad-
genius controversy (Dean Keith Simonton, 2014b), relation between mental health and 
achievement (Dean Keith Simonton & Song, 2009) and other phenomenon (Post, 1994; Suedfeld 
& Bluck, 1993). 
                                                          




Figure 1: Method process flow 
Under this criterion, eminence of an individual or prominence of the event associated with the 
individual could be used as sampling criterion (Dean Keith Simonton, 2009), and in practice, the 
eminence of this person or the prominence of the event could be evaluated by the 
comprehensiveness of representation in archival sources (Dean Keith Simonton, 1999). Eminence 
could be good or bad (Dean Keith Simonton, 2009), which means eminent people could be 
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famous or notorious. In the current study, since I are using the press media releases as data 
sources, I use the extent of media coverage as index of eminence and it is operationalized as the 
number of reports for an individual. 
We start with the names of malicious insiders such as “Aldrich Ames,” “Robert Hanssen,” and 
other known malicious insiders as keywords. Next, I retrieve documents from the Internet 
containing these name keywords utilizing information retrieval techniques (Chakraborty et al., 
2014). The documents retrieved may be news articles, court transcripts, or other accounts of 
insider incidents associated with the named keywords. All cases have multiple articles reporting 
on the incident, hereafter referred to as a “portfolio.” 
2.2.2 Dictionary Construction and Update  
A random subset (n=30) of eminent malicious insiders in the datasets is used in the dictionary 
construction.  The documents retrieved are separated by paragraph for analysis with each record 
in the database consisting of a paragraph from an article. Additionally, when each paragraph is 
stored, a name tag is added indicating which malicious insider this paragraph is describing.  
2.2.2.1. Dictionary Construction 
Construction of the dictionary is a dynamic process with the dictionary updated after each 
portfolio of a malicious insider is analyzed. The basis of this dictionary is derived from the 
attributes in the extant literature (see Table 1).  The characteristic dictionary has two attributes, 
keyword and characteristic. “Keyword” contains target words or phrases I are searching for in 
documents; the “characteristic” implies what the corresponding target words or phrases indicate. 
For example, the keyword “being caught” implies the characteristic of “rule violation”. 
2.2.2.2 Extracting Keywords from Portfolio 
In this step, I first prepare documents via parsing and stemming. Then I employ computer 
aided information extraction techniques used in previous research (Nahm & Mooney, 2002) to 
retrieve keywords from prepared documents that are listed in the characteristics dictionary. 
2.2.2.3 Dictionary update 
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After keywords were extracted with text mining software, I read through cases and manually 
extracted keywords or phrases present in the documents but missed by computer-aided extraction 
in an effort to refine the dictionary.  For example, there may be synonyms to the dictionary words 
and phrases not picked-up by the automated process. These missed characteristics are then added 
to the dictionary.  
After these four steps, I start over again using a new insider’s name, but with an updated 
version of the dictionary. Finally, these iterations will cease once the number of updates drops 
and the returns become marginal.  
2.2.3 Characteristics Extraction 
The 14 characteristics proposed by aforementioned literature have been classified into two 
groups with different extracting strategies.  Group I includes behavioral precursor, predatory 
behavior, financial status, personal or work related event, negative experience, ethical issues, 
disgruntlement, overdependence, social and cultural conflict and rationalization. For this group, 
all characteristics will either be present or not. Therefore once at least one keyword has been 
found in the portfolio, this characteristic will be considered present in this malicious insider case. 
Characteristics in Group II consists of clinical disorders, including personality disorder 
(narcissistic personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder and avoidant personality 
disorder) and mental health disorder (Disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, substance use 
disorder and alcohol use disorder).  The presence of a keyword only indicates the presence of one 
symptom for certain disorder. I used the  procedure recommended by Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013) to 
assess the exhibition of these characteristics. In DSM-V (DSM-5 American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), clinical disorders are diagnosed by diagnose standardized criteria. Typically, 
several symptoms are described for a certain disorder and then the disorder is confirmed if the 
number of symptoms exhibited exceeds certain threshold. The thresholds vary by disorder. For 
example, 7 symptoms are described for antisocial personality disorder such as impulsivity or lack 
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of remorse. If 3 or more symptoms are exhibited, then the diagnose criteria is met. Therefore, for 
characteristics in Group II, keywords belonging to each characteristic are first coded into 
symptoms of the characteristic described by DSM-V by two raters. Then when using the 
dictionary to scan a malicious insider’ portfolio, presence of a keyword represents the existence 
of one symptom into which the keyword has been coded. Finally, if the number of symptoms 
identified exceed the threshold defined by DSM-V diagnose criteria, the disorder is considered 
being exhibited for this malicious insider. 
2.2.4 Validity of Data Collected from Press Media and “Distant” Assessment Method 
News media data has been used in malicious insider studies to identify clinical disorders in 
previous research (Band et al., 2006). The U.S. Department of Defense’s Personnel Security 
Research Center (PERSEREC) has created an espionage database from publically available data 
such as news media (Band et al., 2006; S. Wood & Wiskoff, 1992). Media data has been used to 
analyze the characteristics of employees who conducted internal fraud (Wm. Dennis Huber et al., 
2015) and managers’ behavior in corporate fraud (Cohen et al., 2012). I argue that the secondary 
data, specifically, media data I used in this research offers a valid foundation for analyzing 
malicious insider characteristics. 
Secondary data is data collected by someone other than the current researcher (Pienta et al., 
2011). When conducting “distant” measures of subjects who are not accessible for direct 
assessment or direct measurements are physically or ethically impossible (Dean Keith Simonton, 
2009), various materials could be used to analyze the individual differences of subjects, such as 
biographies, speeches, academic literature or newspapers (Spangler et al., 2012). Materials 
collected from these sources might provide unobtrusive observations of subjects being 
investigated  reducing the interface of researcher or measurement instruments with the subjects 
(Trochim et al., 2015). Various academic endeavors have validated that results from the “distant” 
measures using archival or historical data are comparable with findings resulted from traditional 
direct assessment methods, such as Simonton’s research about mental health of eminent people 
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(Dean Keith Simonton & Song, 2009), personality of US presidents (Dean K Simonton, 1986), 
geniuses (Dean Keith Simonton, 2014a), Mumford’s findings about leadership violence 
(Mumford et al., 2007), and Ligon’s study about famous leaders’ life styles (Ligon et al., 2012).  
Distant measures can all be quite useful when direct inquiry methods such as questionnaire or 
interviewing involves asking question that might be sensitive, embarrassing, or even 
incriminating (Dalton & Metzger, 1992). Social desirability might severely bias the response 
(Thomas & Kilmann, 1975). For example, Robertson argues that managers are reluctant to report 
their true ethical preferences, because they don’t want their ethics to be observed (Robertson, 
1993). 
Newspaper reports  generated at the same time as the investigation of an event or an individual 
(Harris, 2001) could overcome the social desirability bias brought by direct assessment. 
Newspaper or press articles as a data source have been used in numerous academic endeavors 
about individual differences, such as DeChurch et al. (DeChurch et al., 2011) research about 
leadership styles, Harris’ (Harris, 2001) research about business ethics, and Bardi et al (Bardi et 
al., 2008) research about value and value-behaviors. While some might claim such data may be 
incomplete or incorrect, research shows that the findings from newspaper data could be 
comparable with results derived from traditional direct assessments (Bardi et al., 2008). With 
these advantages noted, the current study utilizes news articles along with court documents and 
biographies as a data source to analyze individual differences of malicious insiders.  
Admittedly, newspaper does have bias in its contents; however, I argue that bias in news 
articles won’t be a serious issue as discussed below. Criticism and concerns about newspaper 
report mainly focus two aspects: news articles selectively report events associated with an 
individual (selection bias) and for the event they report, and information of the event is 
manipulatively reported (description bias) (McCarthy et al., 1999). 
With regard to selection bias, critics maintain that many factors will affect the 
“newsworthiness” of an event, and that coverage of events associated with an individual will be 
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selectively biased (Barranco & Wisler, 1999).  Specifically, factors affecting selection bias 
include event characteristics, publisher characteristics and issue characteristics (Oliver & Myers, 
1999). 
However, in the current study I use google search engine to inquiry news articles entries, and 
our data sources are not limited to a specific newspaper or a specific time frame. Articles entering 
into analysis include ones from both local, national, and, in some cases international newspapers. 
Samples in this research contain only malicious insider attacks that draw a national media 
attention. The three factors affecting selection bias won’t significantly reduce the media coverage 
of events.  
For description bias, research has identified three sources for inaccurate or even erroneous 
description: omission, misrepresentation and framing (McCarthy & McPhail, 1998). These 
factors are mitigated by our research methods; since I employ google search engine, multiple 
sources are combined as data source. Therefore, omitted information in a specific newspaper is 
less likely to be omitted by all other newspapers, especially considering I only use eminent 
malicious insider cases. Additionally, the misrepresentation and framing problem would also be 
mitigated by multiple sources; various sources reporting on the same event could help to account 
for differences in reporting.  
To be noted, as I argue for the validity of news articles, that doesn’t imply distortion won’t 
happen in these materials. Our intention is to show that I can overcome some bias in newspaper 
articles. I could also argue that data collected from the malicious insider himself (or herself) or 
authorities could also be biased as all actors have a stake how the events are portrayed (Earl et al., 
2004). 
2.2.5 Data about General Population 
Since I are comparing the malicious insiders with general public in the current study, in this 
section, I will describe where the data of general population, with respect to each characteristic I 
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plan to compare, with came from. A summary of the prevalent data about general public is 
presented in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of general population data source 
Characteristics Sources 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder Stinson, et. al. 2008 
Antisocial Personality Disorder Grant et. al., 2004 
Avoidant Personality Disorder Grant et. al., 2004 
Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder Copeland, et. al., 2013 
Alcohol Use Disorder Grant et. al., 2015 
Substance Use Disorder Grant et. al, 2004 
Disgruntlement Conference Board Mail Survey, 2014 
 
 
The percentage of narcissistic personality disorder in the general public was derived from the 
Wave 2 national epidemiological survey on alcohol and related conditions (Stinson et al., 2008). 
This survey was face-to-face interview with 34,653 subjects nation-wide. This survey used the 
fully structured diagnostic interview proposed by DSM. As reported by Stinson et al (Stinson et 
al., 2008), narcissistic personality disorder has a prevalence of 6.2 percent in the subjects being 
interviewed. 
The antisocial personality disorder, avoidant personality disorder, and substance use disorder 
data for the general public is from National Epidemiologic Survey conducted during 2001-2002 
(Grant, Hasin, et al., 2004; Grant, Stinson, Dawson, Chou, Dufour, et al., 2004). In this survey, all 
regions in the U.S. were sampled, including District of Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii.  The 
minority was oversampled to produce enough respondents. With an 81percent of response rate 
(n=43,093), 3.63 percent of the general public have antisocial personality disorder and 2.63 
percent have avoidant personality disorder. The respondents were interviewed with Alcohol Use 
Disorder and Associated Disabilities Interview Schedule-DSM-IV version (First, 1994). Using 
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the same data, Grant et al. reported that 9.35 percent of the general public have a prevalence for 
substance use disorder (Grant, Stinson, Dawson, Chou, Dufour, et al., 2004).    
Prevalence data for disruptive mood dysregulation disorder (DMDD) was estimated using 
samples from three community studies. With 7,881 observations covering 3,258 subjects,  the 
prevalence of disruptive mood dysregulation disorder ranged from .8 percent to 3.3 percent in 
these three communities (Copeland et al., 2013). With respect to choosing general public 
statistics, I intentionally choose the highest prevalence from previous research. Copeland et al. 
(Copeland et al., 2013) found DMDD as high as 3.3 percent in segments of the general 
population. I used that higher proportion to represent the general public prevalence. 
Prevalence of alcohol use disorder was estimated using 36,309 subjects of US 
noninstitutionalized civilian adults (Grant et al., 2015). Data was collected from 2012 through 
2013 with face-to-face interviews. The results show that 29.1% of the subjects could be 
diagnosed as alcohol use disorder at least one time during lifetime.  
For disgruntlement, data was derived from a mail survey about job dissatisfaction conducted 
by Conference Board to 5,000 households and the response rate of 33.5 percent (Conference 
Board). Conference Board is an independent and international research institution which has 
conducted job satisfaction surveys since 1987 (Conference Board). The characteristic of 
disgruntlement is operationalized as job dissatisfaction in both dictionary construction and 
keyword search. Therefore, the results from malicious insiders and from the general public are 
comparable. 
2.2.6 Methodological and Statistical Control in Comparing Malicious Insiders Group with 
General Population 
We compare the different levels of prevalence for certain characteristics of malicious insiders 
with the general public. In the research studies of the general population structured interviews or 
surveys were utilized to diagnose disorders. However, in our research, text-mining is used to 
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extract the corresponding characteristics of malicious insiders. While the data comes from 
different sources, I took precautions for both the methodological and statistical aspects. 
With respect to diagnosis method, I use the similar process as the one in clinical settings. In 
structured interview and in our method, symptoms exhibited by the subject are first grouped into 
diagnosis criteria, and then the number of diagnosis criteria presented is used to make the final 
diagnosis decision. In our research, keywords describing the malicious insiders are first coded 
into each diagnosis criteria, then the presence of single or multiple keywords themselves will not 
be considered as the existence of clinical disorder. The presence of a certain disorder will only be 
confirmed if the number of diagnosis criteria meets the required limit by DSM-V.  
Statistically, I employ the Fisher’s exact test (Fisher, 1970) to check for difference in 
proportions within two independent samples. The Fischer exact test has been argued to be too 
conservative a test and sometimes won’t find results when they are really there (Berkson, 1978; 
D'agostino et al., 1988; Liddell, 1976). Combined with the fact that I intentionally choose the 
highest percentage among reported results about general public, these precautions effectively 
bridge the gap between different data sources for general public and for malicious insiders.  
2.3. Analysis and Results 
In this section, I first report on the data collection and dictionary refinement results.  Then I 
present the characteristic extraction process and conclude by presenting newly identified 
characteristics that I did not see in the literature.   
2.3.1 Data Collection  
We randomly choose 133 malicious insider threat cases for the current study. All of the 
malicious insiders were found guilty and convicted by U.S. court.  I see this as a check to ensure 
all our cases were indeed malicious insider incidents.  
2.3.2 Dictionary Construction 
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We extracted 380 keywords from malicious insiders’ attributes proposed by extant literature 
and 345 characteristics are refined from these keywords using the characteristic dictionary. Using 
two example statements below, I provide an example of the process.  The first statement is an 
example of characteristics in Group I and the second statement is an illustration of characteristics 
in Group II.  
Example Statement: 
1.Disgruntlement: Employee observed to be dissatisfied in current position; chronic 
indications of discontent, such as strong negative feelings about being passed over for a 
promotion or being underpaid, undervalued; may have a poor fit with current job (Greitzer et al., 
2013).  
2. Antisocial Personality Disorder: The employee engages in persistent lying or stealing, 
disregard the safety of self or others, and possess a superficial charm or wit (Shechter & Lang, 
2011).  
In the first example statement, three keywords are extracted: “dissatisfied”, “discontent”, and 
“pass over for a promotion”, and they belong to the characteristic of disgruntlement. After these 
three records are added into the dictionary, they are used to extract these same keywords for cases 
examined later. If the keyword is found, I consider it as a “hit” for the corresponding 
characteristic.  
In the second example statement, two keywords are extracted: “lying” and “disregard”. These 
keywords are coded into the second and fifth diagnosis criteria of antisocial personality disorder 
(ASPD) in DMS-V (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The second criteria is 
“deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit 
or pleasure” and the fifth criteria is “reckless disregard for safety of self or others.” When used 
scanning the malicious insider portfolios, if the keyword is found, I consider it as a “hit” for the 










1 Dissatisfied Disgruntlement Example Statement 1 
2 Discontent Disgruntlement Example Statement 1 
2 Pass over for a promotion Disgruntlement Example Statement 1 
3 Lie ASPD2 Example Statement 2 
4 Disregard the safety ASPD5 Example Statement 2 
 
2.3.3. Final coding 
Using the final dictionary, thematic analysis was used to code all the keywords. Given the 
existence of a predefined set of characteristics, a deductive approach was used to code the 
keywords (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). The coding started with two separate coders separately 
coding 10 percent of the keywords for the identified overarching characteristics of antisocial 
personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, avoidant personality disorder, alcohol use 
disorder, and disruptive mood dysregulation disorder and then comparing results. The Cohen’s 
Kappa metric for inter-rater reliability between the raters was 0.84, indicating excellent (Fleiss et 
al., 2013) to almost perfect (Landis & Koch, 1977) agreement between the raters. Afterwards, the 
two coders categorized each keyword within its respective higher category into the individual 
characteristic codes within each category. The Cohen’s Kappa metric was 0.97, indicating 
excellent to almost perfect alignment. At this point, one of the two raters coded the rest of the 
keywords. 
2.3.4. Characteristic Extraction Results 
The proportion of malicious insiders identified with substance use disorder is significantly 
greater than in the overall population, (p < 0.001) with the proportion confidence interval from 
0.27 to 0.45 greater for malicious insiders, supporting proposition 3-2. The proportion of 
malicious insiders with antisocial disorder is significantly greater than in the overall population, 
(p <0.001), supporting proposition 1-2, the proportion confidence interval is only 0.01 to 0.13 
greater for malicious insiders. The proportion of malicious insiders being dissatisfied is 
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significantly greater than in the overall population, (p < 0.001) with the proportion confidence 
interval from 0.37 to 0.47 greater for malicious insiders, supporting proposition 4. 
Table 4: Propositions comparison between malicious insiders sample and the general population 
Prop Characteristics 
Study Population Difference Test 























al., 2004) 43093 1 -0.03 0.03 NO 
P2 
Disruptive Mood 





2013) 918 0.40 -0.05 0.01 NO 
P3-1 Alcohol Use Disorder .010 
.291 
(Grant et 
al., 2015) 36,309 <0.001 -0.26 -0.30 NO 







al., 2004) 43093 < 0.001 0.27 0.45 YES 
P4 Disgruntlement .940 
.523 
(Conferen
ce Board) 1673 < 0.001 0.37 0.47 YES 
 
Conversely, the proportion of malicious insiders with narcissistic personality disorder, 
avoidant personality disorder and disruptive mood dysregulation disorder is not significantly 
greater than in the overall population, (p = 0.09, 1 and 0.40 respectively), which does not support 
proposition 1-1, 1-3 nor 2. While significant, the proportion of alcohol use disorder among 
malicious insiders is significantly less than in the overall population, (p < 0.001) with the 
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proportion confidence interval from 0.26 to 0.30 less for malicious insiders, contrary to 
proposition 4. 
If I lower the number of diagnosis criteria down by 1, I have the propositions 1-3 and 2 
supported with regard to avoidant personality disorder and dysregulation disorder, as seen in table 
5.  
Table 5:  Propositions comparison between malicious insiders sample and the general population 
(lowering diagnosis criteria by 1) 
Prop Characteristics 
Study Population Difference Test 























al., 2004) 43093 < 0.001 0.02 0.13 YES 
P2 
Disruptive Mood 





2013) 918 0.003 0.003 0.11 YES 
P3-1 Alcohol Use Disorder .135 
.291 
(Grant et 
al., 2015) 36,309 <0.001 -0.09 -0.22 NO 







al., 2004) 43093 < 0.001 0.27 0.45 YES 
P4 Disgruntlement .940 
.523 
(Conferen
ce Board) 1673 < 0.001 0.37 0.47 YES 
Note:  Statistics are from the same sources of table 4 
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Under the revised criteria, the proportion of malicious insiders with avoidant personality 
disorder is significantly higher than in general public (p < 0.001) with the proportion confidence 
interval from 0.02 to 0.13, supporting proposition 1-3. The proportion of malicious insiders with 
disruptive mood dysregulation disorder is significantly greater than the overall population, (p 
=0.003), supporting proposition 2, the proportion confidence interval is 0.003 to 0.11 greater for 
malicious insiders.    
On the contrary, the proportion of malicious insiders with narcissistic personality disorder is 
still not significantly different from proportion in general public (p=0.65). Also, the proportion of 
malicious insiders with alcohol use disorder is still significantly less than the proportion in 
general public (p<0.001) with the proportion confidence interval of 0.09 to 0.22 less than in 
general public.  
Several issues should be noted from our analysis results. First, when applying DSM diagnosis 
criteria required number of symptoms strictly, most of the propositions about personality or 
mental health disorders are not supported. However, if I just lower the required number by one, 
all of them except narcissistic and alcohol use disorders are significant. This might be due to the 
fact that the diagnosis criteria are applied more strictly in our analysis than in a clinical diagnosis 
in that that one symptom is only labeled as one diagnosis criterion. In clinical practice, one 
symptom might infer multiple diagnosis criteria. For example, if a subject is described as “always 
drunk”, then this might indicate both (1) the subject is taking large amount of alcohol, (2) the 
subject spend a lot of time consuming alcohol and recovering from its effects. However, in our 
research, if the keyword “always drunk” is found in the portfolio, it is only classified into one 
criterion. 
In Grant et al.’s research (Grant, Stinson, Dawson, Chou, Dufour, et al., 2004), substance use 
disorder includes alcohol use disorder. However, in our research, alcohol use disorder is excluded 
from substance use disorder. However, the proportion of malicious insiders having substance use 
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disorder is still higher than the proportions in Grant et al.’s research, indicating an additional 
support for our proposition P3-2. 
2.4. Discussions and Limitations 
We learned that text-mining can be used in a malicious insider study; specifically, the 
information extraction techniques could extract characteristics based on our dictionary.  More 
importantly, it enabled us to validate, and in some cases question, characteristics of malicious 
insiders found in previous research. 
When compared to the general population, malicious insiders exhibited greater proportions of 
most of the characteristics posited, thus confirming the characteristics found in previous research.    
Malicious insiders have more personality problems, mental health disorders, and substance abuse 
problems.   Interestingly, one trait or characteristic that seem to come up often in the previous 
literature is narcissistic personality disorder.    However, our findings suggest that malicious 
insiders actually exhibit less narcissism than those in the general population. This may be due to a 
number of reasons. First, narcissism suggests that individuals want positive attention and 
recognition. Carrying out a malicious act would be contrary to their objectives.  Second, as 
Deluga (Deluga, 1997) notes, narcissism is not necessarily a destructive trait.   In an extensive 
study of their biographies, many US Presidents were found to be narcissistic.    
Table 6: Frequency of characteristics in previous research 
Characteristics Number of Cases Percentage in Total Cases 
Predatory Behavior 133 100% 
Personal or Work Related Event 133 100% 
Negative Experience 133 100% 
Financial Status 133 100% 
Behavioral Precursor 133 100% 
Emotional Issues 132 99% 
Ethical Issues 130 98% 
Mental Health Symptoms 128 96% 
Disgruntlement 125 94% 
Personality Disorder Symptoms 125 94% 
Social Isolation 118 89% 
Overdependence 118 89% 
Rationalization 88 66% 
Social and Cultural Conflict 40 30% 
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As shown in Table 6, all characteristics proposed by previous research are identified in our 
cases, however, with different commonalities. For this study I only offer propositions about 
characteristics in which I could find data on the greater population.   Nonetheless, out text mining 
techniques enable us to identify the most prevalent characteristics from a large sample. Among 
these characteristics, behavioral precursors, predatory behavior, personal or work related events 
and financial status were found in all cases. It remains to be seen how these events influence the 
perpetration of incidents by malicious insiders.     
 More than 90 percent of the malicious insiders in our study have experienced mental health 
disorder symptoms such as paranoia and gender confusion.  Other prominent traits include 
emotional instability (i.e., outburst of temper), ethical issues like lying, lack of empathy or 
disregarding others’ need, disgruntlement such as dissatisfaction with current job, and personality 
disorders symptoms such as arrogance, fantasizing behavior or manipulative behaviors.  Also, 
almost 90 percent of malicious insiders exhibit social isolation or the organization they attacked is 
overly dependent on them.  Of the other of characteristics noted in the previous literature, 
rationalization and social isolation score relatively low.  
Additionally, I identified other characteristics not found in previous research. Interestingly, 
some positive characteristics were revealed in our study such as: dedication to family or work 
(92%) and once being described as agreeable (91%). Since these were not reported in previous 
studies, they require further investigation.  A summary of the new found characteristics is located 
in Table 7.   
2.4.1. Limitations of Current Study 
The current study employs a keyword-based method to extract characteristics from text; 
however, some keywords represent different meanings with different contexts. For example, the 
keyword “bully” is defined as a characteristic with respect to the relations with coworkers. 
However, the appearance of “bully” might indicate the subject bullies others, the subject is 
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bullied, or the subject was bullied in his/her childhood. As I continue to refine the dictionary, 
these issues should wane.  
The primary focus of this study is to empirically validate characteristics or traits of malicious 
insiders.   Although states such as events, activities, and emotions could not be validated for 
commonalities in this study, they could be useful in future research.   An abnormal-based 
detection approach in which a set of normal events, activities or emotions are defined might aid in 
the usefulness of examining states.  Anything outside the defined parameters could trigger an 
alarm.  
Further, I recognize that data (text) in our sample is based on news reports, court documents 
and other third party documents.  It is possible that some characteristics were left out in the 
interview and reporting process.   However, I believe our sample size of 133 eminent cases is 
more than enough to mitigate problems due to omitted information.  Additionally, due to the 
challenge of finding relevant data, I compared our text-mined data on malicious insiders to survey 
based data on the general population.   However, as noted, I took precautions in order to bridge 
the gap of the two data sets. 
 
Table 7: Frequency of newly found characteristics 
Characteristics Number of Cases Percentage of Total Cases 
Dedication to Family or Work 122 92% 
Agreeable 121 91% 
Professional 119 89% 
High Academic Performance  118 89% 
Successful Career 92 69% 
Intellectual 88 66% 
Non-Impulsive 86 65% 
Love-Affairs 85 64% 
Well-Trained 83 62% 
Reputation Problem 66 50% 
 
We stress that this research nowhere to a point where prediction of malicious insiders is 
possible.  No single characteristic can be used to predict a malicious insider.  Rather, I much 
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continue to refine our methods and determine if some set of the characteristics can be used for 
prediction.   
2.4.2 Implications for Research and Practitioners.  
      This study sought to validate a number of characteristics of malicious insiders suggested in 
previous research.    Much of the previous research was based on either single cases studies or 
worked with rather small sample sizes.   With our large sample size of 133 cases I believe 
scholars can have increased confidence in the validity of the characteristics in which I found 
support.     
 As for practitioners, malicious insiders are a significant threat to organizations because of 
the large potential impact they may have. While I stress that I are nowhere near capable of 
predicting if a person is a malicious insider, the validation these characteristics may one day lead 
to better tools and techniques for screening employees.  Additional research on the state-based 
characteristics may also prove useful. 
2.4.3. Future Orientations 
Future research will focus on improving the characteristic extraction algorithm. One possible 
approach is to employ a rule-based method instead of extracting characteristics using keywords. 
Specifically, I propose to build rules that could represent a set of context. An example of the 
“bully” rule proposed would be “{set1} bully {set2}”, in which set1 contains words such as 
insider’s last name, full name and personal pronouns. Set 2 contains words such as peer, 
coworker and colleague. Then if combination “{set1} bully {set2}” appears in document, it is 
definitely a hit for the subject bullies his/her coworkers. 
Another limitation is about the subjects in the current study. While this study investigated the 
“eminent” malicious insiders who are widely reported, I are also interested in malicious insiders 
who do not draw such attentions with less severe consequences. In the future studies I would like 
to work closely with the practitioners who are willing to share the data, in order to fully 
understand the characteristics of malicious insiders. 
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We will also examine the impact of states on malicious insiders.   While this study focused on 
traits, I believe that states may have a moderating effect malicious insider intent and action.   
Future work will consider the interaction between states and traits.   Additional future research 
will seek to identify any interaction effect between traits.  Finally, the characteristics I validated 
have the potential to be used as input to autonomous agents to allow for better screening of those 
individuals that might try to purposely conceal information and carry out insider attacks.  
2.4.4. Conclusion 
The study of malicious insiders is extremely important due to the large negative impact on 
organizations. Previous studies proposed characteristics that might be exhibited by malicious 
insiders, paving the way for future research on malicious insiders.  However, these studies in the 
field are mostly based on small number of cases or experts’ opinions without empirical test on 
large number of real world cases. In this study I investigated the sample of malicious insiders 
who were convicted by U.S. courts. Further, I examined and validated a number of characteristics 
of malicious insiders noted in the extant literature. I also found some new, candidate 
characteristics that warrant further study.  These findings validate some of the proposed 
characteristics from previous research, offering a solid foundation for future academic endeavors. 
  The use of text mining to examine a large sample of malicious insider cases proved to be 
effective and efficient.    With refinement, it should become even more so. Mitigating the threat 
of malicious insiders is of utmost importance and continued research in this domain is essential.   
In this chapter, I compared the prevalence of characteristics among malicious insiders to the 
general public. In the next chapter, I will compare malicious insiders with benign insiders to 
further support the findings. Also, the comparison will be conducted at both single characteristic 
and interaction between two characteristics level. 
In this chapter, the sample of malicious insiders are compared with the general public to validated 
the common characteristics of malicious insiders proposed by literature. Based on the result, 
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malicious insiders do exhibit higher level of certain characteristics. This result offers a solid 
foundation for future research, however, it also raises a question: whether these characteristics are 
unique to malicious insiders or are also shared by the benign insiders? We observed that some of 
the malicious insiders used to be good employees, or even star employees at the beginning of 
their career, for example, Aldrich Ames was awarded by his good work at his early career.  In the 
next chapter, we are going to compare the sample of malicious insiders with the sample of benign 




CHAPTER III: AN EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF MALICIOUS INSIDERS AND 
BENIGN INSIDERS 
 
Insider’s attack is nothing new. In 480 BC, Ephialtes betrayed his own people, the Spartans, 
and helped Persia to invade his homeland, leading to the falling of Spartacus as well as his king, 
Leonidas (Herodotus, about 450 BC).  
Nowadays, with the development of information technology, malicious insiders’ attacks could 
exhibit various forms and thus become a major concern for organizational security professionals. 
In a recent survey by Information Systems Audit and Control Association (Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association, 2016b), 40% of 2907 international  (Information Systems Audit 
and Control Association, 2016b) and 41% of domestic organizations expressed their concern 
about insider attack and social engineering, which are ranked as the second and third most 
concerns about organization’s cyber security, respectively.  
Both practitioners and academics have responded to the threats caused by insiders, or more 
specifically, malicious insiders. For practitioners, CPNI (Center for Protection of National 
Infrastructure) conducted a series of research studies in this area (CPNI, 2013). For researchers, a 
broad body of research has been conducted with respect to the deterrence of insiders’ harmful 
behaviors (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnson, 2014). Additionally, 
collaborations have also been held between industry and academics, such as the US Secret 
Service and Carnegie Mellon University’s extensive research, investigating the characteristics of 
insider attackers and the process of these attacks (Claycomb et al., 2012; Claycomb et al., 2013; 
Keeney, 2005). 
One branch of academic endeavors focuses on the influences of individual differences of 
insiders. Dispositional factors, such as personality traits, are shown to be related to security 
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training effectiveness (Kajzer et al., 2014), adoption of security behavior (Shropshire et al., 
2015) and security deterrence results (D’Arcy & Hovav, 2009). Further, Willison states that 
internal factors could possibly trigger deterrence outcomes (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). This 
argument is also supported by criminology research which found that internalized norms (Sykes 
& Matza, 1957), and personalities (Dolan et al., 2001) play an influential role when offenders 
engage in criminal behaviors. 
In the insider threat literature, psychological traits and dispositions such as personality 
characteristics (Nurse et al., 2014), antisocial personality disorder (Shechter & Lang, 2011), 
narcissistic personality disorder (E. D. Shaw & Fischer, 2005; Shechter & Lang, 2011; B. Wood, 
2000), and psychopathy (Shechter & Lang, 2011) are found as common characteristics of 
malicious insiders. Personality characteristics are the theories of individuals about themselves as 
well as the world around them, and might affect their motivations and behavioral patterns (Dweck 
& Leggett, 1988).  These, in turn, affect how  they think, act and responds to the outside world 
variables (Nurse et al., 2014), such deterrence factors (Herath & Rao, 2009; Hu et al., 2011). 
Therefore, personality and personality disorders play an important role in the study of malicious 
insiders. 
Unfortunately, current studies about the dispositional factors of malicious insiders are subject 
to several problems. First and foremost, many of the studies are based on field experts’ opinions 
(Greitzer & Frincke, 2010; Greitzer et al., 2010; Shechter & Lang, 2011), survey results 
(Johnston et al., 2016), or limited number of cases (E. D. Shaw & Fischer, 2005). There is a lack 
of empirical validation with a large number of real world malicious insider cases many due to the 
fact that it is hard to find data in this domain. The unavailability of data is mainly due to the fact 
that organizations are reluctant to release data about their insider attack events, concerning about 
possible damage to their reputations (Willison & Warkentin, 2013).  
Second, current research mainly focuses on the characteristics of malicious insiders 
individually, without consideration of interactions between these dispositional factors (Band et 
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al., 2006; Moore et al., 2008). Identifying common characteristics of malicious insiders is 
important, but I should extend the research scope by considering interactions among these 
characteristics for the reason that single characteristic might not be sufficient to differentiate 
malicious insiders with their benign counterparts. For example, narcissistic personality has been 
identified as one common characteristic of malicious insiders (Gelles, 2005; E. D. Shaw & 
Fischer, 2005), however, narcissistic personality is also prevalent among the Presidents of the 
United States and even positively related to presidential performance (Deluga, 1997). I argue that 
it is the combination of several characteristics that make the difference as opposed to a single 
factor. 
Last but not least, current research derives common characteristics of malicious insiders 
mostly from pure malicious insider cases (Shechter & Lang, 2011; Vessey et al., 2014) or 
perception of malicious insiders from field experts (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010), without 
comparing them with the benign insiders. This might weaken the usability of these characteristics 
in pre-job screening, organizational deterrence actions, and organizational intervention of 
potential malicious insiders due to a large amount of false positives. For example, as proposed by 
the literature, narcissism is a characteristic of both malicious insiders (E. D. Shaw & Fischer, 
2005) and high performance leaders (Maccoby, 2000). Without comparing malicious insiders 
with benign insiders, I could not isolate characteristics only salient among malicious insiders. 
Thus, I argue that, in order to fully understand the common characteristics of malicious 
insiders, I should compare them with their benign counterparts at both individual characteristic as 
well as interactions of characteristics levels, with large amount of real world cases. In the current 
research, I are asking the following research questions: 
1. Do malicious insiders exhibit different levels of individual characteristics than those exhibited 
by the benign insiders? 
2. Do malicious insiders exhibit different levels of several characteristics simultaneously than 
those exhibited by the benign insiders? 
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In order to answer our research question, I will start with a comprehensive literature review 
about malicious insiders’ characteristics as well as the comorbidity of these characteristics. Then 
in the next section, the data and method used in this research are introduced. Next, analysis 
results are presented and discussed. Finally, I will discuss the contributions and while limitations 
for the current research as well as direction for future endeavors. 
3.1 Literature Review 
In this section, I will first define our research scope by discussing the definition of malicious 
insider and insider threat. After that, individual characteristics of malicious insiders will be 
reviewed. Finally, I will discuss the interactions of these characteristics and propose 
corresponding hypotheses. 
3.1.1 Terminology 
One ongoing problem for malicious insider studies is the lack of a widely accepted definition 
of insiders (Hunker & Probst, 2011). Some research focuses on employees inside the 
organizations (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Willison & Siponen, 2009), some imply that the scope of 
insiders should be extended to former employee (Moore et al., 2008) or even contractors of the 
organization (Band et al., 2006), while others do not specify the boundary between outsiders and 
insiders (S. M. Lee et al., 2004). However, the subjects in all of these studies abuse, or have 
intention to abuse their access, knowledge or privilege of organizational resources. Additionally, 
the scope of current research includes a border range of subjects, not limited to current research. 
Therefore, I utilize the definition of insider from Bishop et al. (Bishop et al., 2008) page 5 : 
An insider is a person that has been legitimately empowered with the right to access, represent, 
or decide about one or more assets of the organization’s structure. 
Consistent with the definition of insider, Predd’s (Predd et al., 2008) page 67 definition of 
insider threat is employed in this study: 
Insider threat is an insider’s action that puts an organization or its resources at risk.  
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As argued by recent security research, insiders who violate the security policy might be due to 
non-volitional intention or purely accidental, but could also be the action of malicious intentions 
(Crossler et al., 2013; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). In the current research, our focus is the 
“bad” insiders who intentionally violate security policy. Thus, subjects of current research, the 
malicious insider, is defined by modifying Predd’s definition: 
Malicious insiders are insiders who are unauthorized but intentionally put an organization or its 
resources at risk to the detriment of the organization. 
Among the classification of organizational insiders, malicious insider is at one end of the 
continuum who intentionally jeopardize organizational assets. On the other end are   benign 
insiders who are willing to take expansive roles to protect organizational resources against risk 
(Posey et al., 2013). In the current study, our focus is to verify characteristics of malicious 
insiders by comparing them with the benign insiders who are in need for all organizations. Thus, 
in the current study, I modify Posey et al.’s definition of benign insiders as follows (Posey et al., 
2013) Page 16: 
Benign insiders are “insiders who are willing to take expansive, active roles” in order to protect 
an organization or its resources against risk or are authorized to risk the organization or its 
resources in order to improve the situation of the organization. 
We argue that although some executives also put organizations or their resources at risk, they 
are authorized to do so, such as that the top executives are paid to take certain level of risk for the 
good of the organization.  For example, Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon may risk organizational 
assets and reputation by pursuing drone delivery, but the company may benefit from reduced 
costs and increased customer satisfaction. 
3.1.2 Characteristics of Malicious Insiders 
In this section, I review individual differences of malicious insiders in literature and propose 
our hypothesis for each characteristic. Previous research shows that these characteristics could be 
classified into 14 categories, including personality problems, mental health disorder, ethical 
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issues, social isolation, stressful event, emotional issues, disgruntlement, social or cultural 
conflict, behavioral precursor, negative experience, overdependence of the organization on the 
individual, preparatory behavior, financial problem and tendency to rationalize their behaviors 
(Liang et al., 2016). However, characteristics of an individual or individual groups could be 
classified into two basic categories: trait and state (Chaplin et al., 1988). In general, traits are 
stable and consistent about an individual, on the contrary, state are temporary (Allport & Odbert, 
1936), also contingent to specific context of each case. Thus in this study, I focus on traits or 
traits-like characteristics and do not expect commonality of states across all cases. 
3.1.2.1 Narcissistic Personality Disorder 
Narcissistic personality disorder is characterized by a pattern of grandiosity and special need 
for admiration (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Criminology research found 
that narcissism is usually associated with offenders, such as sexual offenders (Meloy, 2000) and 
other types of violent offenders (Blackburn & Coid, 1999). In the field of organizational security, 
narcissistic personality disorder is also found to be common among malicious insiders (Shechter 
& Lang, 2011). Narcissistic insiders with the sense of entitlement (Sarkar, 2010; E. D. Shaw et 
al., 1999) often have a feeling of superiority (Maasberg et al., 2015) such as being above the rules 
(Band et al., 2006) or deserving special attention and admiration from others (Shechter & Lang, 
2011). Once their need for superiority can’t be met, they might launch the attack as relief to the 
stress (Band et al., 2006). Additionally, the fantasy of power and success of narcissistic insiders 
(Shechter & Lang, 2011) could worsen the situation by motivating them to seek what they want 
by reaching out to organization’s enemy or competitor. For example, Robert Hanssen reached out 
to a representative of the Soviet Union, offering services and classified information. Part of the 
reason is that he thought his intelligence superiority was unappreciated inside the FBI (Wikipedia, 
2016). Thus, I propose our hypothesis 1 as follows: 
H1: The prevalence of narcissistic personality disorder among malicious insiders is higher 
compared to that of benign insiders.  
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3.1.2.2 Antisocial Personality Disorder 
Individual with antisocial personality shows a consistent pattern of disregarding the rights of 
others and failing to conform to regulations, characterizing by deceitfulness, impulsivity and 
irresponsibility (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Antisocial personality disorder 
is found to be prevalent among prisoners worldwide (Fazel & Danesh, 2002). Specifically, insider 
threat studies also propose antisocial personality disorder as one of the major characteristics of 
malicious insiders (Gelles, 2005; Shechter & Lang, 2011). Antisocial insiders, by definition, 
constantly reject organizational rules and security policy (Crede et al., 2007). Additionally, 
research found that antisocial personality is negatively associated with agreeableness (Furnham et 
al., 2014; Williams et al., 2010) and consciousness (Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Williams et al., 
2010), combined with the findings that low levels of agreeableness and consciousness are 
antecedents of security policy violation (Johnston et al., 2016) or failure to adopt security policy 
(Shropshire et al., 2015), I propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: The prevalence of antisocial personality disorder among malicious insiders is higher 
compared to that of benign insiders. 
3.1.2.3 Avoidant Personality Disorder 
Major symptoms of avoidant personality disorder include fear of criticism or rejection in 
interpersonal situations, refusing to get involved with people in both occupational or interpersonal 
activities, and lack of confidence in social scenarios (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Insiders with avoidant personality disorder are typically less socially skilled and more 
alienated than their colleagues (E. Shaw et al., 1998), resulting in less social support necessary for 
success, especially when coping with stressful event (E. D. Shaw & Fischer, 2005). This could 
escalate the frustration resulting from unmet needs, thus the insiders might seek relief in some 
extreme ways. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: The prevalence of avoidant personality disorder among malicious insiders is higher 
compared to that of benign insiders. 
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3.1.2.4 Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder 
Disruptive mood dysregulation disorder is typically associated with recurrent and severe 
outburst of anger (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Research in insider threat 
found that malicious insider attack also follows serious emotional issues, such as anger 
management issue (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010), exaggerated mood swings (CPNI, 2013) or 
propensity to anger (Gelles, 2005; E. Shaw et al., 1998). I argue that disruptive mood 
dysregulation disorder might be associated with malicious attack in two ways: first, emotional 
regulation is a major developmental task (Cole et al., 1994), and the cognitive development is 
associated with individual’s ability to cope with stress (Compas et al., 1991). Therefore, 
individuals who are incapable of emotion regulation tend to cope with stress in destructive ways. 
Second, the emotional issues of malicious insiders will also manifest themselves as problems of 
accepting criticisms at workplace (Band et al., 2006) or being defensive when given constructive 
feedback (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010). This will likely lead to an unhealthy relationship with 
colleagues and supervisors. As a result of intense relationships, the fulfillment of interpersonal 
needs would be jeopardized, which is a major reason that the individual would launch an attack 
towards the organization from inside (Band et al., 2006). Therefore, I propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: The prevalence of disruptive mood dysregulation disorder among malicious insiders is 
higher compared that of benign insiders. 
3.1.2.5 Substance Use Disorder and Alcohol Use Disorder 
Alcohol and drug addiction is one aspect of mental health disorder (DSM-5 American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). I discuss it separately because findings are contradictory in 
literature.  
While alcohol and drug abuse is labeled as one characteristic of malicious insiders (CPNI, 
2013; Moore et al., 2008), findings in the field of workplace counterproductive behaviors 
disagree. The latter finds that the alcohol or substance abuse is more prevalent among employees 
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who feels guilty and shamed, and is a form of self-destructive behavior other than retaliatory 
behavior against the organization (Martinko et al., 2002).   
We support the argument that alcohol and drug abuse should be labeled as characteristics of 
malicious insiders, because comorbidities of substance abuse and anxiety disorder as well as 
personality disorder are observed in a national-wide survey (Grant, Stinson, Dawson, Chou, 
Dufour, et al., 2004). Coupled with the fact that the addiction behaviors could impair professional 
abilities (Band et al., 2006), employees who have a substance addiction probably fail to work 
effectively and productively, even making mistakes which might result in poor performance 
reviews, disciplinary action (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010), or sanctions (Moore et al., 2008). These 
events might cause the individual stress leading to a malicious attack from inside (E. D. Shaw & 
Fischer, 2005).  Given this, I propose: 
Hypothesis 5: The prevalence of substance abuse among malicious insiders is higher compared 
that of benign insiders.. 
Hypothesis 5-1: The prevalence of alcohol abouse among malicious insiders is higher compared 
that of benign insiders.. 
We consider alcohol abuse separately as alcohol is unique in that it is a legal substance and 
others are often illegal in general or illegal when not used as prescribed.  
3.1.2.6 Disgruntlement 
Disgruntlement is also a common characteristic identified by literature (Warkentin et al., 
2011; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Disgruntlement is typically associated with perception of 
organizational injustice (Warkentin et al., 2011; Willison & Warkentin, 2013), therefore, 
disgruntled insiders tend to behave in certain means to migrate the feeling of inequity (Adams, 
1965). Additionally, unmet needs is one of the motivations which might trigger crime, especially 
when the unmet need is viewed as injustice as in the case of disgruntlement (Agnew, 1992). 
Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 6: The prevalence of disgruntlement among malicious insiders is higher compared 
that of benign insiders. 
In this section, I briefly reviewed common characteristics of malicious insiders and proposed 
our hypothesis about each characteristic investigated in the current research. However, single 
characteristic identification may not sufficient to predict malicious insider and the interactions of 
these characteristics are worth further investigation (Nurse et al., 2014).  
3.1.3 Interaction of Characteristics 
Recall, the second research question focuses on the interactions among these characteristics. 
Thus for the 7 characteristics investigated in this study, there are 21 candidates of interaction 
terms. However, the inclusion of an interaction term in our analysis should meet at least one of 
the following two criterions: one, previous research strongly suggest such an interaction; two, 
empirical evidence about the interaction is observed in previous research and theoretical support 
is strongly in favor of such an interaction.  
3.1.3.1 Interactions of Personality Disorders 
Narcissistic alone is not necessarily a bad characteristic for insiders, what’s more, it might 
even be “extraordinarily useful” (Maccoby, 2000) page 1 for leadership. As noted earlier, 
research shows that the narcissistic personality is positively related to higher performance of U.S. 
Presidents (Deluga, 1997).  
We argue that antisocial personality would dwarf the advantage of narcissistic and foster the 
negative results because antisocial insiders typically lack of empathy and loyalty to others, 
including the organization they work for (E. D. Shaw & Fischer, 2005). This makes them hard to 
form attachments and commitments to colleagues as well as the organization (Gelles, 2005; E. D. 
Shaw & Fischer, 2005). Low commitment is found to be associated with negative attitude (Van 
Dyne & Pierce, 2004). Insider threat studies depict that narcissists with negative attitude towards 
the organization tends to attack or steal organizational resources, since negative attitude always 
trigger neutralization techniques towards insiders’ attack (E. D. Shaw & Stock, 2011). 
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Additionally, antisocial personality is characterized by a pervasive pattern of rationalizing hurting 
or stealing behavior (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Utilization of 
rationalizations will increase the risk that the individual might launch the attack. Therefore, I 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H 7-1: The comorbidity of narcissistic personality disorder with antisocial personality disorder is 
higher among malicious insiders than benign insiders. 
Narcissistic personality disorder is characterized by fantasizing of ultimate success and 
requirement for special admiration (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Neither 
success nor admiration could be achieved without interaction with others. However, individuals 
with avoidant personality disorder are typically less socially skilled  (Band et al., 2006; Moore et 
al., 2008; E. Shaw et al., 1998; E. D. Shaw & Fischer, 2005) and lack of the necessary social 
capital to cope with stressful events (E. D. Shaw & Fischer, 2005) along the way toward success. 
Also, the need for special admiration is very unlikely to be met because of the unwillingness to 
get involved with people. Thus, the unmet professional and interpersonal goals might increase the 
level of strain (Agnew, 2001; Band et al., 2006), leading to possible insider attack. Therefore, I 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H 7-2: Comorbidity of narcissistic personality disorder with avoidant personality disorder is 
higher among malicious insiders than benign insiders. 
3.1.3.2 Interactions of Personality Disorders with Disgruntlement 
As aforementioned in the literature, personality disorders serve as personal dispositions of 
malicious attack (Nurse et al., 2014), however, disgruntlement, as the feeling of organizational 
injustice (Warkentin et al., 2011), typically serves as the stressor or tipping point of a malicious 
insider attack (Nurse et al., 2014; E. D. Shaw & Stock, 2011). In this research, I argue that the 
combination of personal disposition and disgruntlement will significantly increase the odds that 
an insider turns malicious. Thus, I propose the following: 
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Hypothesis 8-1: Comorbidity of Narcissistic Personality Disorder with disgruntlement is higher 
among malicious insiders than benign insiders. 
Hypothesis 8-2: Comorbidity of Antisocial Personality Disorder with disgruntlement is higher 
among malicious insiders than benign insiders. 
Hypothesis 8-3: Comorbidity of Avoidant Personality Disorder with disgruntlement is higher 
among malicious insiders than benign insiders. 
Hypothesis 8-4: Comorbidity of Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder with disgruntlement is 
higher among malicious insiders than benign insiders. 
In this section, I overviewed theories about malicious insiders’ individual characteristics and 
proposed our hypotheses in the current research. The next section focuses on our method and data 
to compare malicious insiders with the benign insiders. Based on the literature, I believe 
malicious insiders would exhibit higher levels of personality disorders than the benign insiders  
Also, the prevalence of interactions for some disorders will also be higher among malicious 
insiders compared to the benign insiders.  
3.2 Data and Method 
One major problem in the malicious insider study is the availability of data (Willison & 
Warkentin, 2013), since it is almost impossible to conduct direct assessment for most of these 
malicious insiders, , Aldrich Ames is serving life sentence in prison and Edward Snowden is 
currently in Russia. Obtaining such data would be difficult to say the least.  Therefore, I employ 
historiometry, a method in used psychology that is targeted to conduct distant assessment of 
historical data (Dean Keith Simonton, 2009), in order to investigate personality issues of our 
subjects. 
Historiometry is a quantitative method of testing psychological hypotheses using historical 
data in order to conduct indirect assessment on individuals who cannot or are not willing to be 
subjected to direct psychological evaluation (D. Simonton, 2007; Dean Keith Simonton, 1990). 
Historiometry methods have been used in plenty of many studies to evaluate CEO’s narcissistic 
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personality (Spangler et al., 2012), creativeness of scientific leaders (Vessey et al., 2014), IQ and 
mental health of geniuses (Dean Keith Simonton & Song, 2009), relationship between US 
presidents’ narcissism and presidential performance (Deluga, 1997) and son on. In all of these 
studies, historiometry is applied to deceased individuals or living ones that are not willing to 
participate in psychological evaluations (D. Simonton, 2007). In the current study, I utilize 
historiometry method to evaluate individuals who are currently unavailable for assessment.    
In this section, I will introduce the sampling criteria, data source and method used in the 
current study. For each part, I will first present arguments from the historiometry literature, then 
discuss the operationalization of these arguments in the current study. 
3.2.1 Unit of Analysis and Sampling Criteria 
The unit of analysis in historometry research could range from micro level such as a single 
decision made by a certain individual to macro level such as a whole generation of individuals 
(Dean Keith Simonton, 2009). In the current research, the unit of analysis is the individual who is 
a malicious insider or a benign insider, which falls into the feasible range of the historometry 
method. 
As a compromise between hypotheses to be tested and subjects’ data availability (Dean Keith 
Simonton, 2009), eminent criterion is typically used to sample the subjects in historometry 
research instead of random sampling (Dean Keith Simonton, 1999, 2009). Under this criterion, 
only significant people that have a comprehensive cover in archival data should be selected to 
represent the population (Dean Keith Simonton, 1999). The historometry method relies heavily 
on archival data about subjects such that only subjects with sufficient historical data could 
promise the reliability of analysis (Dean Keith Simonton, 1999, 2009). Therefore, random 
sampling is often not feasible due to the possible unavailability of data for the sampled subjects. 
To be noticed, the eminence of an individual could be small or big, as long as the eminence is 




As noted in literature, due to the infrequency of espionage cases, it is impractical to draw a 
random sample (Band et al., 2006).  The malicious insiders included in the current study are draw 
from malicious insiders’ population who were convicted by US courts from 2000 to 2015 under 
counterintelligence laws regulations. Attacks launched by these malicious insiders include spying, 
espionage, sabotage, and other security related issues. Also, only cases that draw national 
attention, as reflected by national media coverage, were included.   I found eminent cases. And 
for the benign insiders, I use the same number of subjects drawn from the founders of fortune 500 
companies. Our assumption is that the founders of a company did not create the company to harm 
or destroy it, thus they are considered benign insiders in this study. 
3.2.2 Data Source and Validation 
The data sources for historiometry analysis include both primary and secondary data (Dean 
Keith Simonton, 2003). Primary data are materials generated by subjects themselves, such as 
speeches, interviews and correspondence. On the other hand, secondary data is compiled by 
others, such as biographies and encyclopedias (Dean Keith Simonton, 2003). In past 
historiometry research, various data sources have been used to conduct psychological inquiries: 
biographical materials, newspaper reports and business press stories are often used to analyze 
CEO’s narcissism personality (Spangler et al., 2012); biographies are used to study the relation 
between leadership and creativity (Vessey et al., 2014), US Presidents’ personalities (Dean K 
Simonton, 1986) and mental health for historical figures (Miles & Wolfe, 1936).  
In the field of malicious insider studies, news media data has been used to diagnose clinical 
personality and mental disorders in various research (Band et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2012; Wm. 
Dennis Huber et al., 2015; S. Wood & Wiskoff, 1992). In the current study, I also use secondary 
data to conduct the psychological inquiries, including biographies, court documents and 
newspaper report. I argue that the usage of secondary data could reduce the impacts of researcher 
and measurements on the subjects (Trochim et al., 2015). Also, the usage of secondary data will 
mitigate the effects of social desirability on subjects’ responses (Thomas & Kilmann, 1975), 
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especially when the research focus is sensitive, embarrassing, or even incriminating (Dalton & 
Metzger, 1992). A detailed discussion of the validity of data collected from news media is 
presented by Liang and his colleagues (Liang et al., 2016). 
3.2.3 Research Design 
One advantage of historiometry method is that it could utilize well-established psychometric 
measures when evaluating psychological variables (Dean Keith Simonton, 2009). In the current 
study, I utilize the diagnostic instruments and criteria suggested by American Psychiatric 
Association (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013) to make diagnostic decisions on 
both malicious and benign insiders. However, two departures from traditional behavioral 
measures should be noted: First, the biographical data could not be used directly to measure 
psychological variables. A content analysis method is needed to prepare the data (Dean Keith 
Simonton, 2009; Spangler et al., 2012). Second, instead of measuring the subjects with various 
methods, independent raters could score the psychometric instruments based on the materials in 
order to ensure measurement reliability. In the current study, I use the same method as previous 
research (Liang et al., 2016). This method starts with data collection, followed by descriptive 
keywords extraction and a coding procedure by two independent raters, and finally, diagnostic 
decisions are made based on characteristics extracted from materials based on this dictionary. 
3.2.3.1 Data Collection 
The data collection starts with using Google search engine to query all relevant data about a 
certain subject. Then the search results are filtered to eliminate irrelevant information. For the 
malicious insider subjects, irrelevant information typically included information about people 
with the same name. For the benign insider subjects, this kind of information typically is 
newspaper report about an event associated with a certain CEO with a focus on reporting the 
event but not the person. Then the relevant information is combined as a portfolio for each 
subject. Google represents the largest search engine on the Internet and it searches all to which it 
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has access (Bardi et al., 2008). Therefore, I use Google search results as sources for all public 
available data. 
3.2.3.2 Descriptive Keyword Extraction 
In this process, I first extract keywords used in the literature about malicious insiders’ 
characteristics. Then the pool of keywords is updated by manually adding in keywords emerged 
in the malicious insiders’ portfolio until the updates become  trivial. An example below shows the 
extraction process (Liang et al., 2016): 
Example Statement: 
1.Disgruntlement: Employee observed to be dissatisfied in current position; chronic indications 
of discontent, such as strong negative feelings about being passed over for a promotion or being 
underpaid, undervalued; may have a poor fit with current job (Greitzer et al., 2013).  
2. Antisocial Personality Disorder: The employee engages in persistent lying or stealing, 
disregard the safety of self or others, and possess a superficial charm or wit (Shechter & Lang, 
2011).  
In the first example statement, three keywords extracted are: “dissatisfied”, “discontent”, and 
“pass over for a promotion”. In the second example statement, two keywords are extracted: 
“lying” and “disregard”. In the first step, I extracted 380 keywords from literature about 
malicious insiders’ possible attributes. Then I take a subset of malicious insider cases (n=30) to 
update the pool of keywords. In this step, one of the authors manually reads through all materials 
collected, adding in keywords used in these materials to describe the malicious insiders. An 
example below shows the updating process: 
Example Material: 
1. Hanssen craved the rush he received from leading the perilous double life of the double agent, 
and his Soviet and Russian handlers took pains to stroke his inflated ego, according to the FBI 
affidavit supporting his arrest (Sisk, 2001). 
2. From the beginning of his suspected career as a counterspy, Hanssen showed contempt for the 
U.S. and his FBI colleagues, and boasted of his ability to outsmart them (Sisk, 2001). 
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The keyword or phrase extracted from the first example materials is “inflated ego”. For the 
second example statement, “contempt”, “boast” and “outsmart” are extracted and added into the 
keywords pool. After extracting keywords in one case portfolio, the keywords pool is then used to 
scan the next case portfolio to see the number of keywords found by the keywords pool. Then, the 
new case portfolio is read through in order to manually extract and add new keywords that are not 
included in the pool. This process continues until the number of updates becomes trivial. 
3.2.3.3 Coding Procedure 
Coding procedures include training, pre-coding and intercoder reliability check processes 
suggested by Neuendorf (Neuendorf, 2002). Targeted categories of coding are symptoms of 
narcissistic personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, avoidant personality disorder and 
disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. Also, disgruntlement by itself is a single category. 
The coding started with two separate coders discussing the meaning and distinctions of each 
category, then separately coding 10 percent of the keywords. Since the target categories of coding 
are predefined, I employ a deductive approach to code the keywords (Crabtree & Miller, 1999) 
including two steps. In the first step, keywords are coded into each overarching characteristics of 
antisocial personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, avoidant personality disorder, 
and disruptive mood dysregulation disorder and then comparing results. In the second step, the 
two coders classified each keyword within its respective higher category of characteristic into 
symptoms under each characteristic. The Cohen’s Kappa metric for inter-rater reliability between 
the raters were 0.84 for the first step, indicating excellent (Fleiss et al., 2013) to almost perfect 
(Landis & Koch, 1977) agreement between the raters, and 0.97 for the second step, near perfect 
alignment. At this point, one of the two raters coded the rest of the keywords. 
3.2.3.4 Characteristic Extraction and Statistical Analysis  (Stopped Here) 
The portfolio of subjects in this study consists of data from various sources, therefore I take 
precautions while making diagnostic decisions about subjects and comparing subjects. First, I 
employ similar process as the clinical setting to make diagnostic decision about subjects. Second, 
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I utilize a conservative statistical procedure to minimize the chance of Type I error when 
comparing prevalence of these characteristics between two groups. 
With respect to diagnostic method, I use comparable process as would be implemented in 
clinical setting. In clinical settings, diagnostic decisions of personality disorder are made based on 
the number of diagnostic criteria exhibited by the subject. Each diagnostic criteria represents a set 
of symptoms (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Correspondingly, in the current 
research, keywords are grouped exclusively into the symptoms associated with each personality 
disorder. Once a keyword is found in the portfolio, I consider it as a “hit” for the corresponding 
symptom. After the entire portfolio is scanned, if the number of diagnostic criteria presented in 
the portfolio meets the requirement for each personality disorder suggested by clinical standards 
(DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013), I consider the subject as having such a 
disorder. Case in point, while scanning the portfolio of Robert Hanssen, who spied for the Soviet 
Union then Russia, I found keywords associated with the second (deceitfulness), third 
(impulsivity) and fourth (irritability) diagnostic criteria of antisocial personality disorder. 
According to the DSM-5 (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013), if a subject exhibits 
more than two diagnostic criteria, they should be diagnosed as having antisocial personality 
disorder. Thus I make the decision that Robert Hanssen exhibit this disorder.  
After I extract the characteristics from each portfolio and make diagnostic decisions about 
each subject, I apply the Fisher’s exact test (Fisher, 1970) to compare the prevalence of these 
characteristics among the samples of malicious insiders and of benign insiders. Fisher’s exact test 
is used to check the differences of proportions for categorical variables (Fisher, 1970) and is a 
suitable for the current study, as the existence of a characteristic of a subject is coded 
dichotomous in this study. Also, Fisher’s exact test is criticized to be too conservative in nature as 
it often fails to detect relationships that actually exists (Berkson, 1978; D'agostino et al., 1988; 
Liddell, 1976). This conservativeness offers statistical control in order to ensure that the 
differences discovered by the test actually exist. Fisher’s test has been shown to be an appropriate 
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test to compare the prevalence of psychological characteristics between two different groups 
(Carey et al., 2017; Collier & Friedman, 2016; Garcia-Ruiz et al., 2014). Fisher’s test has been 
used to compare the different percentages of anxiety, depression and stress between rural and 
urban persons (Carey et al., 2017), different percentages of mental health disorders between 
female intimates who attend the psychiatry service and who don’t (Collier & Friedman, 2016), 
and the prevalence of mental health disorders between patients with and without Parkinson’s 
disease (Garcia-Ruiz et al., 2014). 
In this section, I discussed the research design with respect to data collection, dictionary 
construction, characteristic extraction and statistical analysis. In the next part, I are going to 
present the hypothesis test result.  
3.3 Data Analysis 
In this section, I are going to present the hypothesis test results. As I discussed before, Fisher’s 
exact test is utilized to check the differences in proportions. For each hypothesis, p-value and 
confidence interval are reported. 
Hypothesis testing results are shown below in table 8. The proportion of malicious insiders in 
the study sample was higher than in the benign sample for antisocial personality disorder (p < 
0.001, 95% CI [044, 0.25]), avoidant personality disorder (p = 0.04, 95% CI [0.12, 0.0002]), 
disruptive mood dysregulation disorder (p = 0.03, 95% CI [0.12, 0.004]), and disgruntlement (p < 
0.001, 95% CI [0.52, 0.33]), supporting hypothesis 2, 3, 4, and 6. The test results of these three 
hypothesis indicate that the prevalence of antisocial personality disorder, disruptive mood 
dysregulation disorder and disgruntled feelings among malicious insiders is higher compared to 
the group of benign insiders. Furthermore, the proportion of malicious insiders presenting with 
multiple concurrent characteristics was higher than in the benign sample for the combinations of 
disgruntlement and antisocial personality disorder (p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.44, 0.24]), 
disgruntlement and avoidant personality disorder (p = 0.02, 95% CI [0.13, 0.009]), and 
disgruntlement and disruptive mood dysregulation disorder (p = 0.005, 95% CI [0.13, 0.02]), 
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supporting propositions 8-2, 8-3, and 8-4. This result indicates that for insiders with disgruntled 
feelings, if they also have the antisocial personality disorder, avoidant personality disorder or 
disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, they tend to attack the organization from inside. 
Conversely, the proportion of malicious insiders in the study sample was not significantly 
higher than in the benign sample for narcissistic personality disorder (p = 0.86), alcohol use 
disorder (p = 0.08), or for the multiple concurrent characteristics of narcissistic personality 
disorder and antisocial personality disorder (p = 0.11), narcissistic personality disorder and 
avoidant personality disorder (p = 0.25), or disgruntlement and narcissistic personality disorder (p 
= 0.59), not supporting propositions 1, 5-1, 7-1, 7-2, and 7-3. This result shows that the 
prevalence of narcissistic personality disorder and alcohol use disorder is not higher among the 
malicious insider group compared to the benign insider group. Also, neither does the interaction 
between narcissistic personality disorder and antisocial disorder, nor the interaction between 
narcissistic personality disorder and avoidant personality disorder.   
3.4. Discussion and Limitations 
The current research utilizes text mining to collect and analyze data about both malicious and 
benign insiders. I learn that malicious insiders do exhibit a higher level of prevalence of several 
personality disorders compared to the benign insiders. Also, the co-occurrences of certain 
characteristics among these two groups are also compared, revealing a higher prevalence of 
occurrences among malicious insiders. Next, the differences between these two groups are 
discussed in details. 
Several characteristics are shown to be more prevalent among malicious insiders, as well as 
the co-occurrences of these characteristics. Malicious insiders have more antisocial personality 
disorder, avoidant personality disorder, disruptive mood dysregulation disorder and disgruntled 
feelings, indicating that malicious insiders are more prone to disregard the security rules,  are less 
likely to fit in the social setting, are easier to get angry and are more likely to be dissatisfied about 
their job. For the interactions among individual characteristics, interaction between 
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disgruntlement and antisocial personality disorder has a higher percentage among malicious 
insiders than among the benign insiders, indicating that the antisocial malicious insiders are more 
prone to attack the organization if they have unmet needs. Also, interaction between 
disgruntlement and avoidant personality disorder is more prevalent among malicious insiders 
compared to the group of benign insiders, implying the fact that insiders who could not fit into the 
social environment tend to take destructive action toward the organization when they feel being 
treated with injustice. Finally, prevalence of interaction between disgruntlement and disruptive 
mood dysregulation disorder is higher among malicious insiders, supporting our argument that 
insiders who easily become angry and has unmet needs are prone to attack the organization from 
inside.  Although the tests for each individual characteristic is already significant, I observe a 
decrease of p-values of interaction effects test compared to individual effect test, indicating that 
the malicious insiders are more different with the benign insiders with respect to these interaction 
effects. For instances, p-value for avoidant personality disorder test is .04 but the p-value for the 
interaction term between disgruntlement and avoidant personality disorder is only .005, indicating 
that the insiders that are both disgruntled and avoidant are more like to conduct malicious attacks 
compared to the insiders that  are only avoidant. 
However, two characteristic proposed by previous literature, the narcissistic personality 
disorder and alcohol use disorder, are found not significantly more prevalent among malicious 
insiders, neither does any co-occurrences between narcissistic with other characteristics. For 
narcissistic personality disorder, this might be due to the fact that narcissistic is not necessarily 
negative as the narcissistic leaders might have incredible achievement driven by certain 
narcissistic urges (Maccoby, 2000). Also, for alcohol use disorder, this might be due to the fact 
that excessive alcohol usage is an indicator of self-destruction behavior, implying that the subject 
feels guilty or shamed, in which case, the subject is less likely to blame the organization, neither 





Table 8: Hypothesis test result between malicious insiders sample and benign insiders sample 
Prop Characteristics 
Malicious Benign Difference Test 

















5  0.04 0.12 0.0002 yes 
P4 
Disruptive Mood 
Dysregulation Disorder 12 
 
4  0.03 0.12 0.004 yes 
P5-1 Alcohol Use Disorder 18  10  0.08 0.13 -0.01 no 
P6 Disgruntlement 125  68  < 0.001 0.52 0.33 yes 
P7-1 Narcissistic*Antisocial 8  3  0.11 0.09 -0.01 no 





















2  0.005 0.13 0.02 yes 
 
3.4.1 Limitations and future research 
The primary focus of the current study is to explore the prevalence of certain individual 
characteristics as well as their interactions among malicious insiders compared to the benign 
insiders. However, due to the infrequencies of personality disorder as well as other disorders, I 
have very low numbers of occurrences in both groups. This makes the comparison difficult, 
especially for the interaction terms. In the future, I will use measures with finer granularity, such 
as measures of criteria of each disorder instead of the overall disorder. For example, prevalence 
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of narcissistic personality disorder is found not higher among malicious insiders compared to the 
benign insiders in the current research. However, I believe that this is partly due to the fact that 
narcissistic personality disorder is a multi-facets concept which has several diagnosis criteria 
focusing on different aspects such as the superiority feeling and manipulative nature of an 
individual. In the future research, instead of looking at the narcissistic personality disorder as a 
single concept, I are going to analyze how individuals with different diagnostic criteria will 
behave.     
Another limitation of current study is that the malicious insiders are considered as a 
homogeneous group in the current study. However, I observe that some of the malicious insiders 
launch the attack to express their disgruntlement but others do so to benefit from the attack. 
Previous research also indicates the heterogeneity among malicious attacks, arguing that the 
expressive attack and instrumental attack are developed with different mechanisms (Willison & 
Warkentin, 2013). In the future, I will study the heterogeneity of malicious insiders based on their 
personality characteristics and investigate the relationships between personality characteristics 
and the malicious attack behaviors.  
3.4.2 Implications for Research and Practitioners 
The current study validates a set of characteristics of malicious insiders by comparing them 
with the benign insiders. These characteristics are proposed by previous research, however, 
without empirical testing on large scale of samples. The findings of this research set a solid 
foundation for future research to investigate the mechanism of malicious insider attack and pave 
the way for studying why individuals with these characteristics are more likely to launch the 
malicious attack.  
For practitioners, findings from the current research should not be applied without caution. To 
be noted, the pattern of human behavior is so complex that even insiders with all characteristics 
validated in the current study will not necessarily sabotage the organization. The purpose of the 
current study is to provide a framework to red flag potential malicious insiders to facilitate 
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organizational intervention. Specifically, in the organizational security practice, I should pay 
special attention to antisocial employee as they typically disregard rules and policies. For people 
with avoidant personality and with disgruntled feelings, constructing legitimate and effective 
communication channel will be the best way to mitigate the risk. For instance, Bradly Manning 
was reported to have this avoidant personality and was disgruntled during his service. If this have 
raised attention from the authority and have his problem solved, the leaking incident could have 
possibly been avoided. On the other hand, narcissistic employees would be a double-edged sword 
as they might be either the super star or malicious attacker.    
3.4.3 Conclusion 
The ultimate goal of malicious insider study is to mitigate the risk of malicious insiders. This 
paper investigate the individual dispositions of malicious insiders by comparing them with the 
benign insiders, in order to answer the question that what are the characteristics unique to 
malicious insiders. I found that malicious insiders do exhibit some characteristics that are 
different from the benign insiders, such as antisocial personality, avoidant personality, disruptive 
mood and disgruntled feelings. However, some characteristics proposed by previous research, 
such as narcissistic personality and excessive alcohol usage, are not supported by the current 
research, neither does the interaction between narcissism with other characteristics.  
These findings shed light on both the academic research and security practices with regard to 
malicious insiders. For academic endeavors, the validation of these characteristics offers a solid 
foundation for future research about the behavior pattern of malicious insiders, since the personal 
dispositions are the starting point of behavior (Ajzen, 2005). For information security practice, 
findings in this paper offer a framework for organizational intervention to prevent the malicious 
attacks. With future research into the mechanism of malicious insider attack, this field of study 
will offer more insights to mitigate the malicious insider risks. 
In this chapter, I compare the sample of malicious insiders with the sample of benign insiders, 
finding that malicious insiders differ from benign insiders not only at single characteristic level 
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but also at interaction level. I also noticed that although some characteristics are not common 
among all the sample of malicious insiders, the malicious insiders with these characteristics 
conducted the similar type of attack. For example, narcissistic is not a common characteristic of 
malicious insiders based on the result of this chapter, however, we found that malicious insiders 
with narcissistic tend to attack the organization to express their disgruntled feelings. Therefore, in 
the next chapter, I will take a deeper look at the characteristics of malicious insiders at a finer 
granularity. Also, I will investigate the relationship between malicious insiders’ characteristics 




CHAPTER IV: Classification of Malicious Insiders and the Association of the Forms of 
Attacks 
 
In October 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13578 establishing the National 
Insider Threat Task Force, in order to better predict, prevent, and mitigate the malicious insider 
threats to national security (National Insider Threat Task Force, 2011). Even with this national 
endeavor, trusted insiders still betrayed and caused harm to the nation. Case in point, NSA 
contractor Harold Martin III stole and leaked classified documents as well as computer source 
code which jeopardized the national security and sensitive government assets (Cox, 2016). 
Malicious insiders are not a concern for government but also for civil organizations. In a 
recent survey, insider threat is the third highest concern for domestic organizations and the 
second highest of international companies (Information Systems Audit and Control Association, 
2016a, 2016b). Insiders include but are not limited to employees and contractors. Anyone that has 
legitimate access and knowledge about organizational resources is an insider (Bishop et al., 
2008). 
Consequences of malicious insiders’ attacks could be devastating (Willison & Warkentin, 2013) 
including financial loss, damage to reputation, and even long term effects on the organizational 
culture (Hunker & Probst, 2011). Insiders have skills from organizational training, knowledge 
from working, and access granted that enables them to harm the organization at potentially 
greater levels than external threats (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Insiders, once turned rogue, 
could bypass security countermeasures and exploit the organizations trust (Bellovin, 2008). 
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Problems in practice have raised academic attention. Many studies have been conducted to 
investigate various issues associated from malicious insiders, including common characteristics 
(Claycomb et al., 2013; CPNI, 2013; Greitzer et al., 2010; Liang & Biros, 2016), attack 
process(Band et al., 2006; Nurse et al., 2014), motivations (Shropshire, 2009), intentions (J. Lee 
& Lee, 2002; Warkentin et al., 2011), prevention (Willison & Backhouse, 2006; Willison & 
Siponen, 2009), and deterrence of malicious insiders (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2011; S. M. 
Lee et al., 2004). I believe that not enough attention has been given to the heterogeneous nature of 
malicious insiders and their motivations.  
Malicious insiders have been seen as a homogeneous group. However, malicious insiders, as a 
group of human beings, are heterogeneous in nature with respect to their personal dispositions. I 
argue that the ignorance of this heterogeneity will cause several problems. First, uncommon 
characteristics of malicious insiders in a whole possibly mask certain subtypes of malicious 
insiders. For example, narcissistic personality has been found as a characteristic of malicious 
insiders in several studies (E. D. Shaw & Fischer, 2005; Shechter & Lang, 2011). However, 
Liang et al. (Liang et al., 2016) found that prevalence of narcissistic personality disorder among 
malicious insiders is not higher than the general public This should not be seen as a denial of 
narcissism as a characteristic as found in previous research, instead, it provides evidence that 
other types of malicious insiders exist.  Second, individuals with different personalities might 
have different thinking processes or different patterns of response to the environment (Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988). These differences influence  insiders’ responses to organizational security 
measures and deterrence methods (Johnston et al., 2016; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Thus the 
deterrence methods need to take these differences into consideration. 
Motivation research of malicious insiders is coarse grained and does not distinguish between 
instrumental and expressive motivations. Instrumental violations are means to achieve goals other 
than the violation itself. In expressive violations, the commission of the action itself is the end 
goal (Burek, 2006; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). For example, a typical robbery is an 
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instrumental crime because robbery is the mean to illegally take others’ property to a goal of 
obtaining resources. Aggravated assaults are expressive in most cases, since the action of hurting 
others itself is the end goal (Willison & Warkentin, 2013).  I argue that effective deterrence, 
prevention, and organizational intervention of  malicious insiders’ attacks could not be achieved 
without distinguishing between these two types of motivations. 
Expressive and instrumental attacks are not equally deterrable (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). 
Research shows that the legal sanctions applied to instrumental crimes are not equally effective 
towards expressive crimes (Chambliss, 1967). Deterrence means, such as punishment, might 
motivate additional violations because offenders violate rules to make a statement (Leroch, 2014). 
However, malicious insider studies that are based on rational choice theory (Paternoster & 
Simpson, 1996) or similar theories (J. Lee & Lee, 2002; Loch & Conger, 1996; M. T. Siponen, 
2000) overlook the expressive/instrumental distinction and weaken the usability of the research 
on deterrence practice. 
Expressive and instrumental attacks should be treated differently when the organization is 
intervening and attempting to prevent the malicious insider attack. Psychology research shows 
that the expressive and instrumental aggressions are different processes, involving frustration-
reaction process and social learning process respectively (Antonius et al., 2013). Literature on the 
psychological indicators used to predict malicious insiders (Greitzer et al., 2013) as well as 
prevention methods (Willison & Siponen, 2009) mix the two types of attacks. I argue that the 
clarification of these two types of violation will help to further specify indicators for each type of 
attack, better predict malicious insider attacks, and build more effective prevention systems. 
The expressive/instrumental classification of malicious attack is a reflection of 
reactive/instrumental aggression in psychology (Cornell et al., 1996). Personalities are shown to 
be related with different types of aggressions (Antonius et al., 2013; Blair, 2001; Daffern & 
Howells, 2007; Lobbestael et al., 2013; Nouvion et al., 2007). The expressive attack is emotion 
driven as a reaction to threat, but the instrumental attack is more of a cognitive process (Antonius 
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et al., 2013). It is reasonable to argue that the personality disorders affecting emotions would be 
more associated with expressive attacks than instrumental attacks. Instrumental attacks among 
malicious insiders with disorders that affect the cognitive process would be higher than 
expressive attacks. In the current study, I investigate the following research questions: 
1. Are malicious insiders with emotional characteristics more prone to conduct expressive 
attacks? 
2. Are malicious insiders with cognitive characteristics more prone to conduct instrumental 
attacks? 
In the next section, I will review the literature about expressive/instrumental aggression, and 
the relations between aggression types and personality to build the theoretical foundations of this 
paper. Then, I discuss the data and methods used, analysis results are presented, and finally 
limitations and future research are discussed. 
4.1. Literature Review 
The ultimate goal of malicious insider studies is to mitigate the malicious insider threat. 
However, are all threats posed by malicious insiders the same? If not, the seeking of a universal 
method to mitigate these threats might be impractical or even misleading. In this section, I will 
first discuss the differences between expressive and instrumental violations and their implications 
for malicious insider study. Then I focus on one of the differences between the two with regard to 
the individual dispositions of malicious insiders and propose our hypotheses.  
4.1.1 Differences between expressive and instrumental violation  
Expressive violation focuses on the action itself, but instrumental violation is a means to the 
end (Burek, 2006). In the field of Counterproductive Work Behavior (CWB), several researchers 
have called for more in depth investigations into the expressive/instrumental dimension (Bowling 
& Gruys, 2010; Spector et al., 2006) in order to better mitigate the negative effects of CWB. As a 
sub stream of CWB research, malicious insiders’ studies have started to pay more attention into 
this distinction calling for research about its effect on deterrence practice (Willison & Warkentin, 
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2013). However, security research has not made this distinction. I argue that combining 
expressive/instrumental violations could have negative effects in both theoretical and practical 
endeavors. Theoretically, they are different processes involving different constructs. Mixing these 
two might lead to misleading research in the field of malicious insiders.  
Expressive aggression is partly explained by frustration-aggression hypothesis, which states 
that frustration will increase the instigation of aggression, and emotion moderates the possibility 
of actual occurrence of aggression (Antonius et al., 2013; Dollard et al., 1939). Instrumental 
aggression is argued (Antonius et al., 2013) to be partly based on social learning process, in 
which the self-efficacy, commitment, and positive/negative stimuli will play an important role 
(Bandura, 1973). This distinction should be taken into account in malicious insider studies. For 
example, in malicious insiders as well as broader cybersecurity research areas, practical and 
academic endeavors investigated the effect of emotions on deterrence (Loewenstein, 1996; 
Willison & Warkentin, 2013). However, effects of emotion should be treated differently under the 
two violation scenarios, because of a different nomological network in which emotion construct is 
embedded. 
We are not stating that emotion won’t play a role in instrumental violations nor that sanctions 
do not effect on expressive violations. What I argue is that these two types of violations are 
systemically different, therefore they should be treated differently with respect to academic 
research. 
Practically, the significance of this distinction is that offenders with different motivations are 
not equally sensitive to deterrence (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Criminology research already 
shows that legal sanctions that are effective against instrumental offenders might not readily 
apply to expressive crime (Chambliss, 1967), or even motivate individuals to commit crimes to 




Expressive and instrumental violations differ across cognitive processing, neurobiological, and 
psychological factors (Antonius et al., 2013). Cognitively, expressive aggression is found to be 
associated with lower information processing ability (Barratt, 1991)  as well as lower intelligence 
level (Vitiello et al., 1990). Neurobiological research confirmed the differences. Blair (Blair, 
2001) discovered that expressive aggression is associated with a somatic marker mechanism that 
would activate the linkage between factual knowledge and bioregulatory state. Thus in the case of 
expressive aggression, the individual behaves as an “as-if body loop” (Blair, 2001  P728). 
However, instrumental aggression is regulated by the violence inhibition mechanism, which 
states that human beings would control aggression because of cues of distress from others. In the 
next section, I will focus on one aspect among these: the individual differences of malicious 
insiders who launch the attacks. 
4.1.2 Personality Disorders of Malicious Insiders  
Personality is an individual’s theory about themselves as well as the environment. It is 
internalized behavioral patterns and motivation preferences (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). 
Personality characteristics are found to be associated with cybersecurity concerns such as policy 
violations (Johnston et al., 2016), adoption of security behavior (Shropshire et al., 2015) and 
malicious insider attacks (Shechter & Lang, 2011).  
In malicious insiders cases, various personality disorders were observed (Maasberg et al., 
2015; Shechter & Lang, 2011). Disorders (e.g., antisocial personality disorder, avoidant 
personality disorder, alcohol abuse disorder) are more prevalent among malicious insiders 
compared to the general public (Liang et al., 2016). Although previous research investigated a 
bunch of personality disorders or other characteristics (Liang et al., 2016), the current study will 
only focus on narcissistic personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder and dysfunctional 
mood dysregulation disorder because in the literature, these three disorders are most relevant with 
the difference between expressive attacks and instrumental ones (Bettencourt et al., 2006; 
Bobadilla et al., 2012; Lobbestael et al., 2013; Ostrov & Houston, 2008). 
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 Personality disorders are also found to be associated with different types of aggressions; 
subjects with certain types of personality disorders are found to be more inclined to commit 
expressive or instrumental aggressions (Lobbestael et al., 2014; Lobbestael et al., 2013; Ostrov & 
Houston, 2008). However, findings from aggression research are not consistent. Bobbadilla et al. 
(Bobadilla et al., 2012) found that narcissistic personality disorder is more associated with 
expressive aggression, but Lobbestael’s study shows that narcissistic personality disorders 
(Lobbestael et al., 2015) are more prevalent in instrumental offenders . 
We argue that the inconsistency resides in the different facets of a certain disorder. In clinical 
settings, a personality disorder is diagnosed by a criteria exhibited by the subject. However, these 
criteria describe different facets of a disorder. In other words, a certain disorder is not reflective 
but formative on these diagnostic criteria. This argument is supported by psychology studies 
showing that the different dimensions of antisocial personality disorder and narcissistic disorders 
are associated with different types of aggressions (Baron et al., 1999; Lobbestael et al., 2014). In 
this research, I focus on the association between the expressive/instrumental violations and the 
diagnostic criteria, instead of the overarching disorders. Table 1 shows the personality disorders 
of interest as well as their diagnostic criteria (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Diagnostic criteria is shown in table 9. 
In the following sections, I will discuss the diagnostic criteria under each personality disorder 
and its relationship with expressive/instrumental motivations.  
 





AS1 Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors. 
AS2 
Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning 
others for personal profit or pleasure 




Irritability and aggressive, as indicated by repeated physical fights or 
assaults 
AS5 Reckless disregard for safety of self or others 
AS6 
Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain 
consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations 
AS7 
Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing 
having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from others 
Narcissistic 
NPD1 
Has a grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g., Exaggerates 
achievements and talents, expects to  be recognized as superior without 
commensurate achievements) 
NPD2 
Is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, 
beauty or ideal love 
NPD3 
Believes he or she is special and unique and can only be understood 
by, or should associate with, other special or high status people(or 
institution) 
NPD4 Requires excessive admiration 
NPD5 
Has a sense of entitlement (i.e., Unreasonable expectations of 
especially favorable treatment or automatic compliance with his or her 
expectations) 
NPD6  
Is interpersonally exploitative (i.e., Takes advantage of others to 
achieve his or her own ends) 
NPD7 
Lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings 
and needs of others 
NPD8 
Is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or 
her 






Severe recurrent tempter outbursts manifested verbally and/or 
behaviorally (e.g., physical aggression toward people or property) that 
are grossly out of proportion in intensity or duration to the situation or 
provocation 
DMDD2 The temper outburst are inconsistent with developmental level 
DMDD3 The temper outbursts occur, on average, three or more times per week 
DMDD4 
the mood between tempter outbursts is persistently irritable or angry 
most of the day, nearly every day, and is observable by others 
DMDD5 
Criteria are present in at least two of three settings (i.e., at home, at 




4.1.2.1 Narcissistic Personality Disorder  
Narcissistic personality disorder is characterized by sense of entitlement and superiority (First, 
1994). Although labeled as one single personality disorder (DSM-5 American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), narcissism is argued to be a multifaceted concept (Cain et al., 2008; Vazire et 
al., 2008). Factor analysis of narcissistic personality inventory shows four factors under the 
overarching narcissistic construct: Exploitativeness/Entitlement, Leadership/Authority, 
Superiority/Arrogance and Self-absorption/Self-Admiration (Emmons, 1984). In the aggression 
studies, certain aspects of narcissistic personality are found to be associated with different types 
of aggressions (Fossati et al., 2010; Lobbestael et al., 2014; Washburn et al., 2004). Self-
admiration and entitlement are found to be uniquely associated with expressive aggression 
(Bobadilla et al., 2012; Reidy et al., 2008). Because individuals with narcissistic personality tend 
to utilize aggression as a defensive strategy, in order to cope with external rejection of their 
superior ego (Twenge & Campbell, 2003). On the other side, exploitativeness is uniquely 
associated with instrumental aggression (Fossati et al., 2010; Seah & Ang, 2008; Washburn et al., 
2004), as exploitativeness is individual’s tendency to manipulate others in order to achieve 
personal goals. 
Referring to narcissistic personality disorder in table 1, criterion 1 is specific for grandiose 
sense and superiority; criteria 2 and 3 imply the sense of self important and self-admiration. 
Criteria 4 and 5 focus on the feeling of entitlement that requires special treatment or deserve 
excessive admiration from others. Criteria 7 and 8 show the egocentric nature of narcissism. Also, 
criteria 9 implies the individual has a strong feeling of self-importance and superiority. As 
mentioned before, self-admiration and entitlement are uniquely associated with expressive attacks 
(Bobadilla et al., 2012; Reidy et al., 2008). Thus the individual meets these criteria tend to 
conduct expressive attacks. However, criterion 6 focuses on the exploitative aspect of narcissism. 
Therefore, I argue that except criterion 6, all other criteria fall into the cluster of personality traits 
that is more prone to commit expressive violations. To be noticed, not every criteria of 
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narcissistic personality disorder is investigated in this study, but only the criteria that is argued to 
be relevant with expressive or instrumental attack in the literature is tested for the difference. 
Hypothesis 1-1: Malicious insiders with NPD6 are more prone to conduct instrumental 
attacks compared with malicious insiders without NPD6.  
Hypothesis 1-2a: Malicious insiders with NPD5 are more prone to conduct expressive attacks 
compared with malicious insiders without NPD5. 
Hypothesis 1-2b: Malicious insiders with NPD_9 are more prone to conduct expressive 
attacks compared with malicious insiders without NPD9. 
4.1.2.2 Antisocial Personality Disorder 
Although antisocial personality disorder is defined as a pervasively behavioral pattern of rule 
violations and disregarding the interests of others (First, 1994), subscales of antisocial personality 
have been confirmed (i.e., impulsivity, stimulus seeking,) (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Werner 
& Crick, 1999). Generally, antisocial personality is positively associated with both expressive and 
instrumental aggressions (Lobbestael et al., 2013; Walters, 2007). On the level of different 
subscales, certain facets of antisocial personality traits are only associated with one type of 
aggression. Carefree, lack of planning, impulsivity, and nonconformity are found to tend to 
associate with expressive aggressions (Antonius et al., 2013; Bobadilla et al., 2012; Ostrov & 
Houston, 2008), because expressive aggression represents an impulsive, non-planning, and 
carefree coping action to deal with stress (Lobbestael et al., 2015). Lack of empathy, shallow 
affect, and low sensitivity to punishment are common antecedents of instrumental aggressions 
(Antonius et al., 2013; Bobadilla et al., 2012; Ostrov & Houston, 2008). This might be due to the 
fact that lack of empathy and shallow effect would reduce the commitment to others, increasing 
the likelihood of hurting others.  
Referring to the diagnostic criteria of antisocial personality disorder, criterion 3 describes the 
impulsivity of antisocial personality; criterion 4 focuses on the violent coping pattern; criterion 6 
reflects the non-planning attribute of antisocial personality. Thus I argue that these criteria above 
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fall into the cluster that tends to engage in expressive violation. Criterion 2 describes the 
manipulative nature, and criterion 7 focuses on the lack of empathy aspect. Therefore, I argue that 
these two criteria fall into the profile of malicious insiders who are prone to commit instrumental 
violations. Similar to the hypothesis for narcissistic personality disorder, only criteria of antisocial 
personality disorder that are proposed in previous research to be relevant with the differences 
between instrumental and expressive attacks are tested in the current research. 
Hypothesis 2-1a: Malicious insiders with AS2 are more prone to do expressive attacks 
compared with malicious insiders without AS2. 
Hypothesis 2-1b: Malicious insiders with AS6 are more prone to do expressive attacks 
compared with malicious insiders without AS6. 
Hypothesis 2-2: Malicious insiders with AS4 are more prone to do instrumental attacks 
compared with malicious insiders without AS4. 
4.1.2.3 Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder 
Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder is characterized by persistent irritability and 
outbursts of anger (DSM-5 American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Anger, or negative affect, is 
found to be strongly related to expressive aggression as outbursts of temper is a hostile response 
to stress or provocations (Dodge & Coie, 1987). Also, anger would interact with provoking 
conditions to promote aggression (Bettencourt et al., 2006). In a meta analytic review, 
Bettencourt (Bettencourt et al., 2006) found that the anger is uniquely associated with expressive 
aggression under provoking conditions. Therefore, I propose that individuals with disruptive 
mood dysregulation disorder would tend to engage in expressive violation. 
Hypothesis 3: Malicious insiders with any of the DMDD criteria are more prone to do 
expressive attacks compared with malicious insiders without any of the DMDD criteria. 
In this section, I reviewed the literature of expressive/instrumental aggression and proposed 





4.2. Data and Method 
4.2.1 Data  
In the study of malicious insiders, secondary data has been used in the literature. Practically, 
organizations are reluctant to release data about malicious insider attacks because of concerns 
about reputation. Theoretically, secondary data provides unobtrusive data observation of the 
research subject, which avoids the social desirability issue. 
The sampling frame in this study is malicious insiders who were convicted by the U.S court 
from 2000 to 2015. Malicious attacks conducted by these subjects include espionage, leaking 
information, sabotage, and economic espionage. Employing eminent criteria, the current study 
samples a total number of 133 cases. I only use IT related attack cases, which lowers the number 
of cases to 84. 
4.2.2 Method 
The current study investigates the relationship between personality characteristics and 
different types of malicious attacks. For the personality characteristics, I use the same method as 
Liang et al. (Liang et al., 2016), which extracted these characteristics based on a “keyword-
characteristic” dictionary. For different types of malicious attack, two raters rated each case based 
on criteria modified from criminology research to determine the degree of expressiveness and 
instrumentality. In this section, I will briefly introduce these two processes. 
For personality characteristic extraction, I first collect public available data for each subject, 
including newspaper reports, court documents, Wikipedia, biographies, and blogs. These 
materials are combined together as a portfolio for each malicious insider. Then for each 
characteristic mentioned in the literature, I use the descriptive word from the literature to 
construct the original version of the dictionary. Then the dictionary is updated by adding in new 
descriptive words found in the portfolio until the update becomes trivial. After this process, I end 
up with a dictionary of descriptive words about malicious insiders. Then, two different coders 
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code these descriptive words in to each characteristic as the keywords for that characteristic. 
Finally I use this dictionary to scan through the portfolio of malicious insiders: if a descriptive 
word is found, then I see it as a hit for that characteristic. 
For evaluation of the expressiveness and instrumentality, I modified the criteria used in 
criminology research. Also, two different raters first study this criteria, then code 5 cases 
independently. After that, two raters discuss the coding process as well as the results, reaching an 
agreement of coding criteria. At this point, one rater does the rest of the coding. Modified criteria 
are listed below. After coding these cases, categories 1 and 2 are classified as expressive attacks. 
categories 4 and 5 are classified as instrumental attacks. 
1). Purely expressive: In order for malicious attack to be rated as purely expressive, there must 
be absolutely no sign of external goal other than the action itself. Expressive attack is coded if 
there are evidences that the attack is a result of purely ideology, revenge, disgruntlement or a 
belief to right the wrong, in which cases the action itself if the end goal. A typical example of 
expressive attack is Terry Childs, who erased all router settings and shut down the entire city 
network; because his new supervisor asked him to share the password of the city network, which 
made him angry. 
2). Expressive/Instrumental: to qualify for this rating, the malicious attack should show 
evidence for both expressive and instrumental motivations. However, the primary goal of the 
attack should be internal such as disgruntlement or revenge. For example, one malicious insider 
was fired by the company, and he got really angry. As a result, he planted a logic bomb in the 
company’s system that disabled the company’s network. Also, he made a trade in the stock 
market to benefit from this event.  
3). Balanced expressive and instrumental. To qualify for this rating, the malicious attack 
should show evidence for both expressive and instrumental motivation. Also, the internal and 
external motivation should contribute equally to the attack, making it difficult to differentiate 
which motivation is primary. An example of this category is a former employee from the PPG 
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company, who used the commercial secrets of PPG to create his own company, claiming that he 
has been under paid for years and should “correct the wrong”. 
4). Instrumental/expressive: to qualify for this rating, the malicious attack should show 
evidence for both expressive and instrumental motivations. However, the primary goal of the 
attack should be external such as financial gains. For example, Aldrich Ames’s primary reason to 
commit espionage to get rewarded by KGB and to pay his debts. However, his disgruntlement of 
being passed over by a promotion also plays a role in his motivation. 
5). Purely instrumental: to qualify for purely instrumental rating, the malicious attack case 
should have clear evidence of external gains. A typical example will be stealing company’s 
information for sale or illegal export of information technology devices. 
In this section, I introduced the method I used to analyze the data. In the following section, I 
present our analysis results. 
4.3. Data Analysis 
In this section I will present the hypothesis test results about characteristics that are more 
associated with instrumental violations. Then the hypothesis test results about characteristics that 
tend to associate with expressive violations will be presented.  
In the current study, I employ fisher’s exact test (Fisher, 1970) to compare the different 
proportions of malicious insiders who conducted instrumental/expressive attacks between two 
independent groups of malicious insiders with/without certain characteristics. Fisher’s exact test 
is utilized to test the difference of proportions for categorical variables (Fisher, 1970). In the 
current study, I coded the malicious insiders’ action as either instrumental or expressive thus the 
Fisher’s exact test is applicable to test the differences in proportions.  Also, Fisher’s exact test is 
criticized to be too conservative to find relationships that actually exist (Berkson, 1978; Liddell, 
1976). I argue that the conservativeness of Fisher’s exact test is suitable for the current study 
because as the starting point of investigating the relationships between malicious insiders’ 
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characteristics and attack types, I prefer the results to be conservative and solid, in order to set a 
solid foundation for future studies. 
The first group of hypothesis argues that malicious insiders with the following characteristics 
conduct more Instrumental attack compared with malicious insiders without these characteristics. 
The statistical results are shown in Table 10: 
Table 10 Hypothesis about Instrumental Attacks 
Prop Characteristics 
With Characteristic Without Characteristic Difference Test 




NPD_6 38 54 13 30 
0.01 0.09 0.45 YES 
2_1a 
AS_6 16 20 35 64 
0.04 0.07 0.43 YES 
2_1b 
AS_2 32 57 19 27 
0.93 -0.32 0.04 NO 
Note:  
NPD_6: interpersonally exploitative 
AS_6: consistent irresponsibility 
AS_2: deceitfulness 
 
The proportion of instrumental attacks conducted by malicious insiders with NPD_6 (p=.01, 
95% CI[.009,.045] ) and AS_6(P=.04, 95%CI[.07,.043]) is significant higher than malicious 
insiders without these two characteristics. Thus H1_1 and H2_1a are supported. However, 
malicious insiders with AS_2 (p=.93 95%CI[-.32, .04]) do not conduct significantly more 
instrumental attacks, thus H2_1b is not supported.  
The second group of hypothesis argues that malicious insiders with the following 
characteristics conduct more expressive attack compared with malicious insiders without these 
characteristics. The statistical results are shown in table 11: 
Subjects with NPD_9 (p=.047, 95%CI [.04,.039]) conducted significant higher proportion of 
expressive attacks, supporting hypothesis 1_2a. Conversely, malicious insiders with NPD_5 
(p=.58, 95%[-.17,.18]), AS_4 (p=.51, 95%CI[-.16,.20]) and DMDD (p=.27, 95%[-.09, .30]) do 
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not conduct significantly higher proportion of expressive attack compared to malicious insiders 
without these characteristics. 
 
Table 11 Hypothesis about Expressive Attacks 
Prop Characteristics 
With Characteristic Without Characteristic Difference Test 




NPD_9 26 56 7 28 
0.047 0.04 0.39 YES 
1_2b 
NPD_5 13 33 20 51 
0.58 -0.17 0.18 NO 
2_2 
AS_4 13 32 20 52 
0.51 -0.16 0.20 NO 
3 
DMDD 25 57 8 24 
0.27 -0.09 0.30 NO 
Note:  
NPD_9: arrogant 
NPD_5: sense of entitlement 
AS_4: irritability and aggressive 
DMDD: disruptive mood dysregulation disorder 
 
4.4. Discussion and Conclusion 
The results shows that malicious insiders with emotional characteristics will conduct more 
expressive attacks, and that malicious insiders with cognitive indicators tend to do more 
instrumental attacks. Previous research proposed that malicious insiders are actually a 
heterogeneous group with respect to the attack types (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Findings in 
the current research extend the knowledge by discovering relationships between the personality 
characteristics and the attack types of the malicious insiders. 
Specifically, 70 percent of malicious insiders with NPD_6 launch an instrumental attack, 
compared to only 43 percent of malicious insiders without NPD_6 conduct an instrumental 
attack. Also, 80 percent of malicious insiders with AS_6 conduct an instrumental attack, 
compared to only 55 percent of malicious insiders without AS_6. The findings show that 
malicious insiders that fail to sustain job or financial responsibility (AS_6) and that are 
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manipulative in nature (NPD_6) tend to exploit rules or others to achieve personal goals such as 
monetary gain. Therefore, their primary motivation to launch an attack would be instrumental.  
However, another indicator (AS_2) that I proposed to be associated with the instrumental attacks 
is not supported by the data. AS_2 described a deceitful personality and the repeated lying 
behavior. I proposed that malicious insiders who are deceitful might con others for personal 
benefit. However, the high p-value (.93) indicates that malicious insiders with AS_2 actually 
conduct less instrumental attacks compared to these without this indicator. This might be due to 
the fact that malicious insiders conduct instrumental attacks tend to play honest in daily work to 
take advantage of others’ trust.  
For indicators I proposed to be associated with expressive attacks, malicious insiders with 
NPD9 tend to do more expressive attacks. This implies that the arrogant insiders are likely to be 
disgruntled, thus launching attacks is their choice to express their negative feelings. However, 
malicious insiders with NPD5, which describes the sense of entitlement and superiority, do not 
conduct more expressive attacks as I proposed. This might due to the fact that sense of 
entitlement or superiority is actually not an indicator of malicious insiders as indicated by 
previous research, people with the sense of entitlement or superiority probably will perform very 
well in their job (Deluga, 1997). Also, AS_4 which describe the aggressive personality and 
DMDD which portrays the tendency to get angry are not associated with expressive attacks. I 
believe this result is due to the lack of data, since the proportion of expressive attacks among 
malicious insiders with these two characteristics are higher than malicious insiders without these 
characteristics (40% vs. 38% and 44% vs. 33% for AS_4 and DMDD respectively). 
Theoretically, insiders who are easy to get angry tend to expressive their negative feelings in 
destructive and emotional way. Therefore I believe that the relationship is there and I need to 
collect more data to support the statistical testing.  
On the other side, malicious insiders that are arrogant and believe themselves to be superior 
conduct more expressive attack, in which case, the attack itself fulfills their superior feelings. 
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4.4.1 Limitations and future orientations 
Although having a significantly larger sample size compared to previous research, the current 
study is also subject to the problem of data availability. I started with more than 700 malicious 
insider cases but only 133 of them are suitable for analysis with abundant data available. What’s 
worse, after I focus on IT related cases, the number of cases shrinks to 84. Also, I are very 
cautious in identifying characteristics, which might result in Type II error. Both of these would 
result in a lower percentage of characteristics exhibited by malicious insiders than really exists. 
Thus I suspect that some of the hypotheses are not supported not because certain characteristics 
are not prevalent, but because of the smaller sample size to fully exhibit statistical significance. In 
the future research, I are will attempt to enlarge the sample size by adding new cases reported by 
the news media. 
The data for current paper is secondary data, collected from public available source. Thus it is 
interesting and necessary to conduct experiment research to compare with findings in the current 
research, in which case measurement and situations are more controllable. This is also the next 
step of the current research stream.  
Also, this paper investigates the relations between personality characteristics and malicious 
attack types. However, I have not integrated all findings under an overarching theory. It is 
necessary to validate these relationships before I go any further. In future work I will focus more 
on the mechanism and overarching theories to explain the behavioral patterns of malicious 
insiders.  
4.4.2 Implications for research and practitioners 
The result has a profound implication for both academic research as well as practice. Previous 
academic research shows that prevalence of narcissistic personality disorder among malicious 
insiders is not significantly higher than the general public (Liang et al., 2016), however, I found 
that certain aspect of narcissistic is prevalent among malicious insiders who conducted 
instrumental attacks, as indicated by our findings that 70% of malicious insiders with NPD6 
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conducted the instrumental attack. This result implies that certain aspects of narcissistic labels a 
subtype of malicious insiders and calls for a deeper research into the heterogeneity. On the other 
side, even the hypotheses that are not supported also shine lights on some interesting facts. For 
example, malicious insiders with AS_2 who are deceitful and tend to con others for personal gain 
actually conducted more expressive attack than malicious insiders without this characteristic. If 
this hypothesis is tested oppositely, it is almost significant (p=.20). This definitely calls for future 
research into the opposite side evidence. 
Also for practitioners, the result indicates that not all “red flags” of a malicious attack are 
equal and insiders showing different characteristics should be treated differently in order to deter 
or prevent the attack. Specifically, if an insider shows irresponsibility or exploitativeness, it is 
best to deter the potential insider attack by enforcing award and punishment mechanism. 
However, for malicious insiders with precedents of expressive attacks, it is best to focus on the 
inner feelings of them to prevent the disgruntlement to escalate to the possibility of launching a 
malicious attack. 
4.4.3 Conclusion 
Although many studies investigated the characteristics of malicious insiders, few of them 
considered malicious insiders as heterogeneous group. Previous research did not analyze the 
relationships between characteristics of malicious insiders and the attack types they launched. In 
the current research, I found that emotional characteristics are associated with expressive attacks, 
which is used to express the negative feeling of the attackers. Cognitive characteristics of 
malicious insiders are more prone to launch instrumental attacks where the primary goal is 
personal benefit. Malicious insiders, who fail to sustain financial or job responsibility and who 
are manipulative in nature, tend to launch instrumental attacks; malicious insiders that are 
arrogant tend to launch instrumental attacks. 
The findings of this paper show that malicious insiders are different with respect to their 
personality characteristics as well as types of malicious attacks. Therefore, in both academic 
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endeavors as well as security practice, I should differentiate them. In the field of malicious insider 
study, I should realize that expressive and instrumental attacks have different motivations and 
process. Thus the differences of antecedence and precedence of these two types of attacks should 
draw our attention. In the security practice, I should notice that different characteristics exhibited 
by insiders might indicate potential attacks of different types. I must deal with these two different 
types of insiders with different strategies because instrumental attacks are easier to deter with 
reward or punishment than expressive attacks. Otherwise, the methods used to deter instrumental 




CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
In this study I investigate the common characteristics of malicious insiders by comparing them 
with the general public as well as the group of benign insiders. I found that malicious insiders do 
exhibit some characteristics at higher level than both the general public and the benign insiders. 
Specifically, the prevalence of antisocial personality disorder, avoidant personality disorder, 
disruptive mood dysregulation disorder and disgruntled feelings among malicious insiders are 
higher than both the general public and the benign insiders. Also, the prevalence of substance use 
disorder among malicious insiders is higher than the general public.  
Also, I found that the malicious insiders differ from the benign insiders not only at single 
characteristics level, but also at the bi-characteristics interaction level. Specifically, the malicious 
insiders group exhibit more interactions of disgruntlement and antisocial personality disorder, 
disgruntlement and avoidant personality disorder, as well as disgruntlement and disruptive mood 
dysregulation disorder. These interactions differ malicious insiders with the benign insiders at a 
higher level, and if used to predict malicious insiders, less false positive prediction will be 
achieved. 
Finally, I investigate the relationships between malicious insiders’ characteristics with the 
different types of malicious attacks they conducted. I found that malicious insiders with 
emotional characteristics tend to conduct more expressive attacks to express their disgruntlement.  
On the other side, malicious insiders with cognitive characteristics tend to conduct more 
instrumental attacks as a mean to achieve other goals such as financial gain. 
The findings in this study are interesting and valuable to both practitioners as well as academia. 
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Results for the current research pave the way of future investigation of the behavior of malicious 
insiders as well as the mechanism behind malicious insider attacks. As this research validated the 
characteristics proposed by previous research, it offers a solid foundation for future research to 
investigate the behavioral pattern of malicious insiders as well as the theory behind these 
characteristics.  
For practitioners, findings in this paper offer a framework to identify potential malicious insiders 
in order to mitigate the insider threat. Also, results of chapter four suggest that different strategies 
should be applied to deter different types of malicious insiders, because the expressive attacks 
and instrumental attacks have totally different motivation. Ignoring this difference would possibly 
lead to ineffective prevention of malicious insider attacks, or even worsen the situation. To be 
noticed, findings in this paper should not be abused in information security practice as even an 
insider has all characteristics confirmed in this study, he or she would not necessarily launch the 
malicious attacks. The purpose of this study is to red flag potential malicious insiders and provide 
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